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While decentralization holds out the promise of increased flexibility and efficiency, the preconditions 
for realizing it are daunting. To draw lessons for productive decentralization in integrated river basin 
management, this paper surveys the decentralization experience in education, healthcare, roads, 
irrigation, and public infrastructure services.  Case studies reveal that the prime focus in the design of 
a decentralized structure must be accountability, based on principles of subsidiarity, transparency, and 
allocation of property rights. While some debates are sector specific, others, such as the need for 
political and financial accountability, the related data requirements, educating stakeholders and 
potential beneficiaries of the new system, and ensuring effective participation, are true of 
decentralization wherever it is to unfold. In turn, initial conditions and the adaptation of political 
leadership to suit the historical context determine the success of decentralization.  Four issues 
demand high priority in integrated river basin management.  These are: (1) overcoming financial 
inadequacy at the lower levels; (2) commitment to upgrading skills, particularly management skills, 
while also ensuring that the expertise accumulated in central bureaucracies is not dissipated;  (3) 
assuring pre-reform beneficiaries that their rights would be protected; and (4) sustaining a long-term 
commitment to an inevitably slow and drawn out decentralization process. The main conclusions of 
the literature survey caution those who believe that decentralization is, in itself, a solution to 
problems of inefficiency and inequity in developing countries. Trade-offs and tensions need to be 
reconciled (e.g., economies of scale versus local monitoring; integrated management or inter-regional 
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Decentralization is a process of transitioning from a governance structure in which power is 
concentrated at the central or national level to one in which the authority to make decisions and 
implement them is shifted to lower level governments or agencies (including parastatal 
organizations).  The resulting governing structure is anticipated to deliver public services more 
efficiently and equitably.  Because of proximity to the locus of action, decentralization offers the 
prospect of lower transactions costs and the generation of information most relevant for serving the 
consumer of public services.  As such, it is expected that decision-makers at decentralized levels may 
be held accountable for the outcomes of their actions, and for this reason are more likely to be 
motivated than the anonymous bureaucrats in the central government.   
The principle of decentralization has acquired increasing prominence in a variety of 
development activities, as also in the management of river basins.  Although river basin 
decentralization is expected to benefit the people residing and operating within the ecological area, 
case studies point to mixed results.  For example, greater efficiency with respect to storage 
capacity and power production can result where decentralization allows upstream and 
downstream hydropower producers to negotiate the quantity of flow of water in the river.  
On the other hand, since all issues of allocation cannot be resolved through negotiation 
alone, as with priority rights among competing users of river water, the intervention of a 
higher level of authority may be necessary and decentralized river basin management is less 
effective (Wandschneider, 1984).  Successful decentralization depends on negotiated 
voluntary arrangements, conflict resolution mechanisms, and the institutions necessary to 
support them. 
  To draw lessons for productive decentralization in integrated river basin 
management, this paper also examines the decentralization experience in several other 
sectors: education, healthcare, roads, irrigation and water supply, electric power and anti-
poverty programs. Because significant decentralization efforts have been undertaken in these 
sectors, they are relevant for the present discussion.  Recent analyses have focused on the problems 
faced in achieving effectively functioning decentralized operations while also proposing the measures 
to overcome them.   
Viewed from a technical perspective, the allocation of certain tasks to particular levels of government 
is relatively uncontroversial. For example, Prud’homme (1994) suggests that redistributive 
actions are likely to be more effective when taken by the center.  Similarly, in analyzing 
democratic decentralization in the state of Kerala (India), Sharma (2003) observes that local 
level planning energized attention to basic needs issues, such as housing, animal husbandry, 
and drinking water but could not address external effects on the local economy, such as 
falling prices of cash crops and unemployment.  Proponents of decentralization argue that 
such decisions as the design of schooling facilities, the schedule of instruction, and staff 
assignment to teaching courses are most efficiently taken by the school principal or a 
committee comprising parents and staff. 
However, because decentralization depends on a complex set of organizational and financial 
measures, the most effective approach to it is not always straightforward.  As an example, the 
provision of a new road involves several tasks, such as determining its location and design, 
identifying the target group of beneficiaries, procuring finance, awarding construction 
contracts, and determining the proportion of costs to be recovered and how to recover 
them. These tasks may be allocated to different levels of government in several ways.  Moreover, 
because the technology of service delivery differs across infrastructure and social sectors, 
strategies for decentralization need to be adapted to these variations.   2
  While the allocation of particular tasks across levels of governments must take into 
account the specificity of the sector, certain management principles, nevertheless, apply 
across sectors. A review of the literature points to common themes for successful 
decentralization.  First, the historical context and initial conditions, including geographical and 
climatic features, existing patterns of service provision or traditional methods of addressing 
the user’s need, and economic conditions significantly influence the pattern of 
decentralization. Second, political leadership is key to overcoming the implementation hurdles 
that arise in the transition to decentralization; these include: (1) inadequate financing; (2) 
paucity in skills, particularly with respect to management and supervision; (3) resistance from 
those who benefit from the centralized structure; (4) how to sustain interest in the 
participatory process for the long term. Leadership is also critical to ensuring that 
administrative, political, and fiscal decentralization operate in tandem. 
  The prime focus in the design of the organizational structure is accountability, which 
may be achieved through decentralization based on principles of subsidiarity, transparency, 
and allocation of property rights.  These, however, are abstract concepts and their 
implementation is determined by the initial conditions.  Successful application of the 
principles depends on how well they are tailored to suit the historical context.  It is to carry 
out this adaptation that political leadership is essential in the pursuit of accountability.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the key characteristics 
favoring centralization and decentralization, defines some of the forms of decentralized structures, 
and briefly describes multiple, and complementary, facets of decentralization to support efficiency 
and equity; The third section discusses the relative roles of centralized decision making and 
decentralization in the context of river basins.  The fourth section reviews decentralization in other 
sectors to draw lessons for river basin management.  The fifth section highlights equity issues.  Select 
issues relevant to integrated river basin management are described based on case studies in the 
literature in the sixth section.  The seventh section summarizes lessons learned in light of experiences 
in other sectors, and the final section pulls together the main findings of the paper.  
2. KEY CHARACTERISTICS FAVORING CENTRALIZATION AND 
DECENTRALIZATION 
Decentralization involves a redistribution of authority and allocation of resources with more power 
being shifted away from the central or national level to lower levels of government.  The lower levels 
vary across countries and across sectors.  Generally, in nations which have federal structures they 
consist of state or provincial governments, and municipalities or districts within them.  There are 
other examples, such as the village Panchayats in India or Upazila Parishads in Bangladesh (Ahmad, 
1992).  Levels may even include a river basin organization as in the water sector or a school as in the 
education sector.  
Forms of decentralized structures 
In many cases, decentralization is initiated as a matter of national policy followed by implementation 
of necessary structural changes also by the central government, as has been the case in Mexico, 
Brazil, and Papua New Guinea to cite a few examples.  Under this scenario, the lower level of 
government becomes responsible for the delivery of public services, with some sectors being more 
decentralized than others.   
Administrative decentralization can take place within an organizational or in a socio-political context.  
Functions are said to be deconcentrated when some of them are shifted within an organization, as from 
the center to field offices at lower levels.   In this case, either all authority is centralized or some 
flexibility is allowed so that field offices can adjust central plans to suit local conditions.     
Alternatively, the local government is responsible for delivery of services under central guidelines and 
supervision.  This is essentially an administrative restructuring but maintaining central control.  For   3
example, district committees in Sri Lanka are provided funds to manage services locally.  A different 
kind of structure that aims to facilitate local coordination is an integrated model in which local bodies 
may plan and implement programs but may not raise the necessary revenue to run them.  In this 
instance, these bodies do not constitute an independent local government.  They continue to receive 
policy and technical advice from the ministries. 
Sometimes authority to make decisions is delegated to independent corporations or agencies who also 
manage specific functions.  These may include revenue collection and allocation, and construction 
and management of infrastructure undertakings, such as dams, school buildings, and roads.    
When local communities, in geographically delineated areas, manage their own necessities by electing 
or appointing local representatives who function without direct central control then authority is 
considered to be devolved to that level.  Devolution is more complete when local governments may 
also raise revenue and decide on expenditures based on local needs.  In Papua New Guinea the 
provincial government raises taxes to finance rural health services and simultaneously runs hospitals 
for the national government using grants from the center.    
The above definitions found in the literature (Ahmad, 1992; Mills et al., 1990; McGinn and Welsh, 
1999; Shah and Thompson, 2002) are meant to describe the nature of reorganization under 
decentralization but different forms and combinations may coexist depending on many factors.   
These include historical context and initial conditions, geographical features particularly the size of 
the country and objectives.  For example, the community may demand equity even at the expense of 
some efficiency or vice versa.  In areas of West Bengal, India, farmers preferred public regulation of 
water markets by village panchayats (local governments) who set price ceilings to prevent price 
discrimination by monopolists, owners of large tubewells who exploited small farmers (Rawal, 2000).  
In the democratic decentralization movement (People Planning Campaign) in Kerala, community 
participation, local governance, and equity are the deepest concerns when making choices in 
healthcare and education (Elamon and Ekbal, 2000; Ganesh and Ramakrishnan, 2000; Tharakan, 
2000).  In this case, it appears that the criterion for success in decentralized organization is whether 
the system works and not because it is the most efficient.   
Central control versus decentralization 
The essential trade-off is between efficiency achieved through economies of scale that favors 
centralization and efficiency and equity benefits through local or decentralized decision-making 
(Besley and Coate, 1999).  
Technological economies of scale 
Technological economies of scale are a key justification for centralization.  Such scale economies vary 
considerably by sector and within sectors by type of activity.  There is also some evidence that scale 
economies have declined recently in infrastructure sectors, like power and telephony, due to 
technological innovations (Estache and Sinha, 1994; World Bank, 1994) thus weakening the case for 
central control.   
Decentralizing public services with economies of scale is more difficult to justify on the basis of 
increasing efficiency unless the welfare losses are low enough that they can be overcome or 
compensated for in gains somewhere else (Prud’homme, 1994).  In the rural road sector in Zambia, 
neighboring communities are considering joint arrangements to enhance the scale of projects to 
attract private contractors (Robinson and Stiedl, 2001).   
In addition to technological economies of scale, central control is justified by such regulatory and 
administrative considerations as: inter-jurisdictional externalities, planning (as in designing an 
electricity transmission grid or locating hydroelectric plants), and certain regulatory functions such as 
price setting.  Several studies emphasize the need for a balance between centralization and 
decentralization, by reminding reformers of the crucial roles played by a central authority (Humplick 
and Estsache, 1995; Kleemeier, 2001; Prud’homme 1994; Rodinelli and Nellis, 1986). 
Transaction costs 
Proponents argue that a key efficiency gain from decentralization is lower transaction costs.  This 
may occur for a variety of reasons.  Availability of better information at the local level with regard to   4
feasible technologies and the specific needs of customers, where properly used, can improve 
efficiency.  A related gain is greater accountability when responsibility for decision-making and 
implementation of programs is placed in the hands of local leaders.  Participation at the local level 
can also improve skill levels and through this and other mechanisms enhance equity (Ahmad, 1992; 
Bardhan, 1996b; Besley and Coate, 1999; Conyers, 1984; Devas, 1997; Litvak and Seddon, 1999; 
Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 1999).   
Sharma (2003) presents an interesting picture of the reality on the ground.  Public perception indeed 
agrees with the notion that local planners are more in tune with issues important to them and this is 
evident from the attention paid to basic needs, such as housing, roads, water, and vegetable farming.  
However, many project proposals were not the product of deliberation and solutions based on local 
level know-how.  In fact, proposals followed suggestions from handbooks, there was little financial 
analysis and a tendency to continue on-going schemes in various government departments.  This 
occurred due to a shortage of expertise and also the belief that those proposals were more likely to be 
approved and funded by policy makers.  While one might concur with the idea that skill levels will 
improve through participation this is unlikely in the short run but could be a likely outcome in the 
long run due to training programs and from working alongside state level experts assigned to the 
projects.  All this means increased expenditure.  Additionally, there are training programs for 
resource persons who mobilize and conduct meetings, allowances and honoraria paid to new 
appointees (panchayat staff and committee members) and the cost of organizing meetings 
themselves.  In practice, the net effect on transaction costs is not so obvious.  
Equity 
The reasons put forth for decentralization include reduction in public spending (at least for the 
central government), increase efficiency in resource utilization, and more efficient management of 
public service delivery.  Decentralization is also espoused as a principle because it is meant to give 
people the power to influence decisions that directly affect them.  This last concept is appealing 
especially to adherents of “democratic decentralization” and “people’s power” (Sharma, 2003; Isaac, 
2000).  They see decentralization as a way to enforce accountability.  National governments 
themselves view decentralization as a mechanism that will attract and employ resources other than 
those available to them, in the provision of public services.  However, since the distribution of wealth 
and skills is not uniform across all regions and localities, large disparities in services are likely to 
emerge.   
Prud’homme (1994) argues that the central government is in a better position to reduce interregional 
disparities through transfers built into the national budget.   Redistribution of incomes among 
households within regions, by local governments, is unlikely to reduce the differences between 
regions since the treatment of households with similar incomes would vary among regions.  If the 
center’s redistributive function is weakened through decentralization then interregional inequalities 
are likely to persist and may even increase in the long run.  The central government can perform its 
redistributive function provided it retains sufficient control of taxation and expenditure policies. 
While decentralization of infrastructure and social sectors is popular in many areas of the world, 
there are some inherent obstacles in implementation.  Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998, 1999, 2000a, 
2000b) have expressed the view in several studies that the institutional structure for local 
accountability is not already in place in developing countries and unless the local power structures are 
changed by some means, infrastructure delivery could be diverted to local elite who capture the 
government or agency. 
Respondents to a survey of people’s perception of decentralization in Kerala (Sharma, 2003) 
complained of beneficiary selection along political or family lines.  Some respondents interviewed in 
the case study perceived local leaders to be no different from centralized agencies and felt that the 
new system did not bring any real benefit.  The same survey, however, also found that in spite of the 
complaints against beneficiary selection, overall, local governments (panchayats) were still viewed as 
being more aware of the needs of the poor.   5
Accountability  
Accountability has political and financial dimensions.  It is about whether decisions are made to 
address local preferences and needs and whether the mechanisms, such as the electoral process are 
effective in signaling voters’ views.  In the Mexican context, Greffe (1998) speculates if one-term 
tenure for an elected official is sufficient to indicate either approval or disapproval of the 
performance of elected officials.  Accountability is also about the successful collection of revenues 
and subsequent use of public funds, which in turn requires financial information.  Bird (1994) 
suggests regular financial reporting both to the local users and to independent audit agencies.   In 
particular, central evaluation could be exercised by renewing financial commitments or approval for 
borrowing from capital markets based on past performance.   
Realizing accountability depends on the quality of supporting institutions both to enforce fulfillment 
of commitments to local beneficiaries, for conflict resolution, for financial accounting, and for 
technological assistance and expertise.   
Conflict Resolution 
Conflict resolution is essential to reduce transaction costs and for any progress to be made under 
decentralization.  Conflicts under decentralization may occur in several different contexts.  The case 
study in Kerala (Sharma, 2003) suggests some of these.  The administrative structure at the local level 
(panchayat) consists of elected bodies called panchayats at the level of the village (grama), the district, 
and the block.  The grama sabha refers to the people in the process of planning.  In addition there 
are a host of volunteer and other staff and committees of experts to take on various tasks.   
Among these are trained resource persons who organize and conduct group discussions at meetings.  
Against this background, the major source of conflict arises when resource persons and members of 
implementation committees are selected based on political affiliations.  One of the expectations of 
decentralization is that slow progress due to divisiveness at the state level could be avoided if some 
issues are directly dealt with at the local level.  However, joint commitment on issues affecting the 
village as a whole is derailed when political or religious differences underlie discussions rather than 
the merits of the case.  Besides, power may be centralized within these structures and their 
functioning may be counterproductive to the objectives of decentralization. 
Another source of tension is between politicians and bureaucracies at the state level and local level 
agencies.  State level expertise is sorely needed at the local level but at the same time officials and 
politicians from the centralized structures do not want to give up their power and want to strike a 
bargain.  For example, members of legislative assemblies demanded separate constituency 
development funds hoping to maintain their power by controlling some of the funds earmarked for 
projects proposed through the local level procedures.  Simultaneously, local level activists had 
difficulty understanding financial statistics and deciphering what level of funding was to be devolved 
to them.      
Conflicts arise when experts are called in to approve of the technical aspects of projects, and they are 
viewed as encroaching on the rights of elected bodies.  A similar situation can arise when there is a 
lack of expertise in fiscal management at the local level.  Again, in Kerala, the state level agencies 
managed cash outflow and revenue collection while the panchayats were expected to account for 
expenditures.  However, it was found that pancahyat secretaries were unable to provide accounts.  
Locals were not comfortable with the appointment of “implementation officers” to help with the 
accounting as they felt that they were giving up some control over their funds (Sharma, 2003). 
Differences arise between state level planning and local level planning due to divergence in priorities.  
Further, when funds are transferred for state sponsored schemes there is a reluctance to integrate 
plans being drawn up locally into projects drawn up by the state agencies. 
Sharma (2003) illustrates the link between conflict resolution and accountability in the case of a 
panchayat where a disagreement in the first meeting resulted in a cancellation of all future meetings.  
The question that arises is who is going to intervene and ensure that the local bodies are accountable 
to the citizens they serve and therefore obligated to convene and continue discussions?  This 
highlights the need for supporting institutions that can perform functions that are parallel to what the 
judiciary, press, and legal system do at higher levels of government, at the local level.  Supporting   6
institutions may also have to be those that can provide technical assistance in order to help choose 
among competing proposals based on their feasibility. 
The state has a key role to play in facilitating the decentralization process through initiating forums 
for discourse, establishing financial guidelines, capacity building, setting a timetable, legislating and 
setting up advisory bodies and resource institutions that are interested in local problems and finding 
solutions that work locally. 
In the context of river basin management conflicts arise among competing users of the water in 
rivers and in a decentralized management structure these have to be resolved through negotiation.  
Wandschneider (1994) argues that negotiation is effective when there are clearly defined property or 
priority rights.  If this is not the case, then a higher authority would have to intervene to defuse the 
situation. 
Technical expertise  
Under centralization, large investments are made in central bureaucracies in research and 
development.  Qualified people, interested in public service are drawn to these bureaucracies in the 
hope of superior career prospects, varied job opportunities, and better resources.  With 
decentralization, the accumulated pool of expertise is dissipated because the roles of central 
bureaucracies are shrunk and there is job loss.  It is unclear whether the associated loss in efficiency 
can be made up by local governments or even by the private sector given the smaller capacity and 
shortage of skills at the local level and the uncertainty of the private sector being able to mobilize the 
kind of investment that central governments can.     
Shortage of technical expertise at the local level is not only crucial to successful decentralization but 
also draws attention to the fact that there are limits to what can be expected of local bodies and has 
long term implications from a central perspective (state, regional or national).   For example, 
(Sharma, 2003) describes how local agencies (grama panchayats in Kerala) are capable and motivated 
when it comes to dealing with problems relating to people’s basic needs especially since these issues 
also enjoy the involvement of citizens and tend to make the exercise successful.  (In fact, in a survey 
of public opinion, the success of local planning rested largely on whether the basic needs problems 
had been addressed and resolved as against reduction of corruption and quicker action).  While this 
in itself is progressive, the question that arises is what the choice of projects means for long-term 
economic growth and development as priorities in local plans are markedly different from those of 
central schemes.  Investment is shifted away from large and medium industry and power generation 
projects to the small-scale sector.  Further, when project proposals are of poor quality due to lack of 
expertise, financial institutions are reluctant to provide credit. 
At the same time decentralization could not address problems that affected the local economy 
critically but were beyond their control.  The case study involves a state whose economy is dependent 
on remittances from labor employed overseas.  Declining demand overseas for local labor and the 
effect on local employment could not be addressed by decentralization and describes a situation 
where central (state government) intervention was clearly necessary.   
Service provision 
Services, such as, power production and roads, requiring advanced technical expertise, management 
and administrative skills are less suitable for efficient local production than, for example, solid waste 
management. Technological advancements allow vertical disintegration (unbundling) in each sector 
permitting some aspects of service provision to be local while others are central.  Thus, while garbage 
collection is not technically complex and can have efficiency gains from local provision, garbage 
recycling or processing requires more advanced skills.  Where there is greater potential for 
competition, there is less need for regulation. So, factors affecting competition determine whether 
regulation in the sector is more efficient locally or not.  The greater the economies of scale and 
dependence on expertise lower the potential for competition and the less likely that regulation can be 
handled locally. On the other hand, if information about local conditions and more direct monitoring 
are important in the sector then local regulation may be preferable (World Development, 1994).  
Water production is more technically sophisticated and has greater economies of scale thus requiring 
more regulation than local water distribution which is less complex.     7
Financing of services 
Generally and especially in developing countries, the tax base on which local governments depend is 
insufficient to cover expenditures. This implies that local governments depend on transfers from the 
center.   Central governments can use transfers to induce a level of service or to work jointly with 
local governments to take advantage of economies of scale.  Transfers, however, do not enhance 
allocation efficiencies because they distort decision-making.   
Some services like water and power can be financed through user fees and are easier to decentralize 
in some aspects.  However, garbage collection is not easy to charge based on the quantity of garbage 
and is financed through taxes.  Services like education and health have to be financed by both fees 
and taxes. This is because the central government is interested in maintaining uniform standards of 
service and there are important externalities.  Local governments have significant stakes in extending 
coverage of good quality education or health to all those in their jurisdiction because there are 
significant consequences for the local economy.  A high degree of dependence on central transfers or 
taxes and a relatively weak local tax base make it difficult for services supported by taxes to achieve 
efficient production or allocation.  Bird (1994) observes how local governments prefer to substitute 
new construction for maintenance of deteriorated facilities in response to availability of national 
funding for infrastructure investment but not for operation and maintenance. 
Large size and income of countries are factors conducive to successful decentralization (Mills et al, 
1990; Prud’homme, 1994).  Bird (1994) expresses similar ideas in terms of the “spatial concentration 
of beneficiaries”.  The population, economic activity and tax base at the lower level has to be large 
enough to allow efficient production of the service but small enough to achieve the information, 
participation, and accountability improvements.  Transferring authority to set and collect fees to 
small weak governments is unlikely to produce any efficiency gains.  The idea is to balance the power 
between the central and lower levels in such a manner as to retain a central government that is strong 
enough to perform its duties and at the same time to transfer authority to local governments which 
have the ability to use that power efficiently.  In large countries it is possible to establish special semi-
autonomous agencies to manage specific functions.  For example, the River Basin Authorities in 
France are responsible for management of water resources.  These agencies have the power to set 
water rates and pollution taxes and to collect the proceeds.  They may also utilize the revenues for 
water production and treatment programs.  The decentralizing of regulation also benefits large 
countries rather than small ones because the costs and skill requirements of establishing multiple 
agencies may take away efficiency gains in small countries (World Bank, 1994).     
It is more complicated to decentralize and finance infrastructure sectors with spillover effects and 
substantial negative or positive externalities than others.  For example, highways, telephones, power 
production, water production, and transportation are all services that involve large networks that 
have externalities for neighboring districts.  On the other hand, decentralizing more localized services 
with few externalities, such as, ports or urban transport, and water distribution is likely to be feasible 
and achieve efficiency gains.  Akin et al. (2001) study local government budgeting decisions under 
decentralization in Uganda by analyzing district level health budgets.  They find district planners 
allocated declining amounts to public goods and services relative to private goods.  They conclude 
from their data that spillover effects from neighboring districts influenced planners to adjust their 
health budgets downwards.      
The functions within each sector have to be shared among central, regional, and local governments 
to enhance overall efficiency.  In general, capital infrastructure investments and design, and auditing 
are more efficient under central control.  Other functions that are more dependent on local 
information and subject to local accountability, such as, design selection and who should benefit 
from it, collection of fees, operation, maintenance and sometimes monitoring and regulation, setting 
of standards and addressing complaints from users can all be decentralized with adequate training or 
through contracts with private providers wherever feasible.  Greffe,  (1998) suggests that in the 
Mexican context, municipalities should be responsible for local distribution networks and policy in 
functions such as water supply and waste disposal, street cleaning, and electricity distribution; states 
should co-ordinate and manage activities undertaken by the municipalities including redistributive   8
and spillover effects across municipalities; with the federal government in charge of services that 
have nationwide externalities and efficiency implications, as with regulating standards and 
redistributive functions across territorial units.   
3. MANAGEMENT OF RIVER BASIN SYSTEMS THROUGH 
DECENTRALIZATION 
The concept of integrated river basin management has its roots in a collective effort “to make water 
use economically productive, socially equitable and environmentally sustainable” for all users within 
the basin (Alaerts and Le Moigne, forthcoming).  The river basin suggested a natural unit, due to its 
hydrological interconnectedness, within which to coordinate all decisions relating to achieving these 
goals.  Acceptance of the physical unity of the river basin is central to sustaining the ecosystem while 
also facilitating economic growth and human welfare through an integrated approach (White, 1998; 
World Bank, 1993a).  The Dublin Statement of 1992, demands a holistic approach to management of 
water resources, linking social and economic development with protection of natural ecosystems and 
also linking land and water uses across an entire catchment area or groundwater aquifer.  The call for 
integrated management of water resources was further endorsed in Agenda 21 at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de Janeiro in 1992.  This holistic approach 
thus entails greater integration and centralized decision making in certain dimensions while 
competition for resources within the basin makes feasible and increases the desirability of 
decentralization and stakeholder participation.   
Awareness of diversity is critical especially when explaining the outcomes of different river basin 
projects and also when formulating policy.  Characteristics of river basins vary considerably and 
overriding priorities to be tackled in one instance may differ from those in another.  The size, 
topography, and hydrological features are some of the physical differences that must be recognized 
across river basins.  But, in addition, economic and social elements vary across river basins.  The 
region’s degree of economic affluence determines its ability to attract federal attention and resources 
and the distribution of assets within the region conditions the access to water resources and the 
extent to which different stakeholders can voice their interests.  In addition, traditional community 
structures and practices are likely to influence the choice of governance structures.   
Objectives of integrated river basin management 
Primarily, coordination of multiple activities and resolving conflicts, particularly those stemming 
from negative externalities are the key functions of integrated river basin management. These are in 
addition to the traditional objectives of allocation of water, supply, waste treatment, and water quality 
maintenance.  These activities involve financing and development of infrastructure in a manner that 
ensures sustainability of the ecosystem and therefore, of water.   
Alaerts and Le Moigne (forthcoming) present an overview of organizational models adopted by a 
number of river basin organizations.  While they report over twenty different models in existence, 
they may be classified roughly, as those that are large organizations which perform planning, 
regulatory, and operational functions involving infrastructure, and those that are small agencies 
concentrating on planning, policy, and coordination only.  Models differ for example, in the extent of 
the role played by the central government, in whether they undertake operations or not, and in the 
specialized tasks they are entrusted with.  For example, the Mexican Water Councils report to and are 
supervised by the National Water Commission, the central agency.  In the Australian Murray-Darling 
basin, the governments of the riparian states carry out operational duties while The Murray-Darling 
Basin Commission coordinates inter-state planning and policy.  The Tennessee Valley Authority is 
responsible for hydropower in its jurisdiction.   
It is important to reiterate the point made in section 2, that decentralization even within river basins 
is not a simple or monolithic concept.  In different contexts, the specific rationale for 
decentralization also guides the appropriate form of decentralization.  First, administrative 
decentralization delegates authority to lower levels of government, from federal to state and from state   9
to municipal authorities.  Second, devolution may include the establishment of formal water users’ 
associations that participate in official monitoring and regulatory functions.  In this form of 
participation, water users play the role of protecting their rights, ensuring, for example, that prices 
charged are fair and/or water quality standards are being respected.  Third, in addition, participation 
can be more far reaching, as, for example, when stakeholders are engaged directly in the process of 
managing resources and delivering services—Ostrom (1996) refers to such participation as 
“coproduction” (see also Evans, 1996 and Lam, 1996 for the analysis of coproduction). 
  With respect to administrative decentralization, again, the key objective is to achieve greater 
bureaucratic efficiency.  As Alaerts (1999, p. 18) notes: 
“In a world with more competition for scarce water, water management organizations shift from 
a top-down hierarchic bureaucracy model into clusters of complementary flexible task-specific 
organizations that are managed like enterprises aiming at achieving pseudo-commercial goals, 
and that are more demand-responsive.” 
Examples of such bureaucratic entrepreneurship and flexibility do exist.  In the context of irrigation 
bureaucracies, Wade (1997) concludes that Korea’s more user-friendly bureaucracy compared to the 
more rigid and unresponsive systems in India helps explain some part of Korea’s greater gain in 
agricultural productivity.  But having recognized such important differences, the task of changing 
bureaucratic structures tends to be an extremely demanding one.  Such institutional engineering, Alaerts 
(1999) concludes, often requires decades for successful implementation.  For example, the “paragon 
of modern-day river basin management,” Australia’s Murray-Darling Commission took almost 80 years 
to begin functioning effectively as conflicts persisted between riparian states.  In addition, 
decentralization, to be effective, has to be accompanied by financial autonomy, which often requires 
considerable institutional reform and, in particular, the establishment of some form of (possibly, 
modest) water pricing.   
Centralization and decentralization in river basin management 
Is the lowest appropriate level of management in a river basin, a central agency like the river basin 
authority or a sub-basin entity like the water user association?  In practice centralization and 
decentralization are not dichotomous choices.  Rather, most systems are likely to lie along a spectrum 
between the two extremes.  However, for the purpose of clarifying the underlying concepts and 
highlighting the relative importance of alternative strategies, Table 1 below suggests a scheme for 
linking the decentralization/centralization decision to the objectives of river basin management 
outlined above.   












Centralization (as in a river 
basin authority) 
√  √    
Decentralization     √  √ 
Formal water users’ 
associations 
√  √    
Informal stakeholder 
participation 
   √  √ 
 
Centralization in the river basin helps achieve coordination of infrastructure, human resource 
development, and the setting of general priorities for water allocation, water quality, and land-use.    10
Central authority is also needed to set standards, both of a technical nature and those that relate to 
establishing accountability.   
The potential for economic efficiency of centralized management of river basins arises from their 
special economic characteristics.  These include, as Wandschneider (1984) notes: (a) indivisibility of 
investment projects, especially those for dams and storage; (b) hydrological externalities, e.g., 
downstream users depend on upstream actions; and (c) the public good nature of the river basin 
infrastructure, e.g., flood control infrastructure can be used by all without reducing the benefits of 
other users and exclusion of users from the right to use is also severely limited.  Therefore there are 
market failures and it is conceivable that a central agency with jurisdiction over the whole river basin 
is a suitable management organization.  Such a system can take advantage of economies of scale in 
large projects, internalize externalities, and manage the hydrological interconnectedness.   
The case for centralization also appears in the public administration literature where fragmented 
administrative structures are thought to suffer from duplication, the lack of coordination, and lack of 
accountability (Bish and Ostrom 1973 summarize and critique this literature).  Once again, the 
recommendation is for a central public management agency, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority.  
Thus, both economic and public administration logic can serve to support the goal of “integration” 
through a central agency in river basin management. 
However, centralization suffers from the disadvantage of “bureaucratic cumbersomeness and slow 
response” (Chioccioli, Hamdy, and Lacirignola, not dated).  In his review of river basins, Barrow 
(1998) cites evidence that river basin authorities tend to be “inflexible” and “over-ambitious.”  In 
particular, centralization is ill-suited to resolve conflicts among diverse stakeholders and is ill-suited 
also to harness the local traditions and knowledge that are often essential not only for raising 
productivity of water use but also, and perhaps more importantly, for sustaining delicate ecosystems.   
In principle, appropriate decentralization can achieve efficiency gains through more effective delivery 
of service to users and also through more prudent use of local resources and initiative.   
Decentralization can be the definitively superior approach where institutional arrangements also help 
achieve the coordinating function of centralized systems.  Wandschneider (1984) cites the Columbia-
River system as evidence that a polycentric or a pluralistic distribution of authority can be effective 
and a centralized system is not the only way that market failures can be overcome.   
However the outcomes of a decentralized structure would differ from those arising from central 
control (Wandschneider, 1984).  By choosing between decentralization and centralized systems one is 
also choosing between unanimity and majority rules and this determines whether all stakeholders 
benefit or some groups are marginalized.  In the decentralized-negotiation approach the principle of 
unanimity allows each right-holder a veto, implying that a change from the status quo is possible only 
when the new option is a win-win situation for all stakeholders.  Under majority rule, that is, when 
the national government is elected to power and uses its authority to make policy decisions, then the 
choice is neutral between alternatives.  The option preferred by the majority (assuming they are the 
most powerful groups) is imposed on the minority even if they are opposed to it and takes the right 
to a solution that best addresses their preferences away from them. 
Negotiated outcomes necessary for decentralization, however, can only be successful when property 
rights are well established.  Wandschneider (1984) notes that along the Columbia-Snake River 
System, fishermen were able to negotiate with hydropower utilities only when property rights in 
fishing were established.  But conflict between instream users (principally hydropower utilities) and 
irrigators remained because instream rights remained unclear.  Thus decentralization risks the danger 
of raising transaction costs2 where functions overlap across agencies and users are poorly organized 




2 Use of instream water is both non-exclusive and fugitive.  That is, if water is available for one user to access it 
is available to all.  For this reason, individual users do not have an incentive to demand a right on their own but 
would have to do so collectively to obtain one (Wandschneider, 1984) thus increasing transaction costs.   11
to play their proper role.  Ostrom (1990) also describes the challenges of achieving negotiated 
outcomes, using examples of groundwater basins from the south coastal plain of the state of 
California in the United States.  However, while recognizing the importance of differing local 
conditions, she is ultimately more optimistic with regard to the prospect of negotiations leading to an 
efficient “self-regulatory” outcome. 
Participation and Water Users Associations 
User and other stakeholder participation can effectively complement administrative decentralization.  
Participation is sometimes described as providing a “voice” to stakeholders (see, for example, 
Narayan 1995).  However, it is more helpful to think of participation as providing de facto property 
rights.  In a situation where legal rights of individuals and households are ill defined, participation can 
be a collective mechanism of creating property rights, in the sense that it can establish (sometimes 
implicit, but real) claims on the use of assets or in the sharing of revenues.  An aspect of the 
coordinating function that the government otherwise undertakes in a centralized structure is now to 
be managed by the stakeholders and users themselves.  Viewed through this lens, participation can be 
critical to achieving coordination and, hence, provide significant benefits.  Solanes (1998) refers to 
this “as a process of democratizing and balancing water decision-making and water-related activities”.   
However, despite its potential, participation in the context of river basins has remained “too limited 
and narrow in focus” (Visscher, Bury, Gould, and Moriarty, 1999).  Mechanisms to achieve greater 
participation are poorly understood.  Moreover, not only are there significant challenges to achieving 
greater participation, but also there is at least some risk that the process of participation can be 
highjacked where diverse stakeholders have unequal bargaining power (see, for example, Koppel, 
1987, Solanes, 1998, and Kemper and Olson, 2000).   
Complex interactions also arise between self-organized, community-based watershed organizations 
and public agencies.  Centralized agencies with their hierarchical structures and standardized 
operating procedures tend to be “unreliable partners” with local stakeholders (Thomas, 1999).  In 
this respect, less structured, decentralized administrative agencies tend to be more responsive to 
stakeholder objectives.  Lam (1996) notes, in the context of Taiwan, that bureaucratic agencies 
staffed by local population tend to be aware of local needs and can interpret official guidelines in a 
manner sensitive to local requirements (see also, Wade, 1997 for a similar argument in the Korean 
context).  However, the very same features that lead to a successful public-private partnership also 
generate the possibility and perception of agency capture by local stakeholders (Thomas, 1999). 
  When is participation relevant?  In the context of river basins, the most important role 
played by participation is in allocating water among multiple demands, such as hydropower, drinking 
water, irrigation, conservation, and a host of other sectors (Dourojeanni, 1994).   Koppel (1987) 
stresses also the importance of user participation for improvement of performance  and sustainability of 
investments made by area improvement programs.  Ghai and Vivian (1992) highlight the importance of 
participation for the preservation of delicate ecosystems and, in particular, the benefits that accrue when 
traditional knowledge and practices are deployed.  Agarwal and Narain (1999) also emphasize the 
critical importance of harnessing traditional techniques to collect water through village-based 
harvesting systems, whose viability has been undermined over time by centralized control; they argue 
that such “dying wisdom” may offer the best alternative to large dams and other water development 
projects to avert a water crisis in India. 
How does participation occur?  Participation occurs at different levels, either by dialogue among 
stakeholders such as hydropower utilities, federal, state and local government agencies, business 
representatives, agriculturists and users.  It may also occur at the level of water user associations 
where users bound by a single purpose may organize themselves.  Stakeholders may participate in 
workshops, through membership in administrative bodies or in public hearings.  The lowest appropriate   12
level of management in a river basin may be the river basin authority that invites participation or it 
may be a water user association that monitors, operates and manages a small-scale irrigation system.  
Some user associations with elected office bearers and perhaps a self-financing mechanism may be 
registered, while others are more informal.3  There is a wide variation in the function, structure, 
membership criteria, title to water rights, legal recognition, and the leverage they have with 
institutions at higher levels.  Solanes (1998) cites an interesting example of how engineers, through 
the American Society of Civil Engineers, are actively engaged in drafting legal guidelines to integrated 
river basin management.   
What are the benefits of participation?  Cowie and O’Toole (1998) note that the benefits of 
participation are multifaceted.  While the ultimate objectives are efficiency, equity, and sustainability, 
participation can help achieve these objectives through other channels such as, increased credibility 
and legitimacy, better information offering opportunities for innovative solutions more suited to 
local conditions, and joint ownership of results.   
Recent studies, in quite diverse contexts, have indeed found that participation has a big impact on 
efficiency.  The methodology usually analyses changes in baseline data, over a five to ten year period, 
using both qualitative and quantitative techniques (generally multivariate regression analyses).  Data 
for these analyses is typically from primary surveys, often designed specifically to evaluate the impact 
of decentralization.   
In a study of rural water supply projects, for example, Narayan (1995) finds beneficiary participation 
to be the single most important factor contributing to project effectiveness and sustainability.  Other 
outcomes, such as, percentage of water systems in good condition, overall economic benefits, 
percentage of population covered, equality of access, and environmental effects also benefit from 
participation.   
  The impact of participation has also been assessed in watershed management projects in 
Nepal and Maharashtra, India, for example (Wagley, 1999; Lobo and Palghadmal, 1999).  These 
analyses typically show large gains through participation.  In the Nepalese case, community 
development conservation committees were involved in a variety of activities to increase agricultural 
yields.  These included introduction of new seed varieties, the diffusion of agro forestry technologies, 
soil conservation (through the construction of embankments), planning, implementation, and 
maintenance of project activities.  This wide ranging participation created not only short-term gains 
but also helped build capacity that allowed these gains to be sustained and enhanced.   
   Not all examples of participation are successful.  Samad and Vermillion (1999) assess the 
impact of participatory management on the performance of irrigated agriculture in Sri Lanka.   The 
program involved transfer of full responsibility for the operation and maintenance of several 
irrigation schemes to farmer organizations.  The authors investigate whether participation reduced 
the cost to the government and to farmers, whether the quality of irrigation service improved, and 
whether agricultural productivity per unit of land and water was higher where irrigation management 
transfer occurred. The methodology compared performance indicators before and after transfer, and 
with and without intervention.  The results were mixed.  Over time, a significant decline occurred in 
government recurrent expenditures for irrigation in schemes where transfer had occurred; but 
expenditures also declined where there was no transfer to farmers’ organizations.  The cost to 
farmers remained the same following a transfer, but farmers contributed less in cash and more in 
labor.  The reforms, by themselves, did not bring about significant improvements in the quality of 
irrigation levels, though a combination of transfer and physical rehabilitation did show increase in 
agricultural productivity. 




3 In the context of irrigation, the term “water users association” is a generic term for an organized group of 
irrigators with some involvement in irrigation management (Subramanian, Jagannathan, and Meinzen-Dick, 
1997).   13
Participation can, sometimes, even lead to undesirable outcomes.  This occurs where there is severe 
inequality in stakeholder access to resources and hence to participation.  As noted earlier, high levels 
of education and superior organization lead to more leverage for high-status farmers than is possible 
for poor farmers.  Lack of available information, low social status, and the lack of economic strength 
are all related to low levels of participation—and to inefficient and iniquitous outcomes where 
participation is attempted in such contexts.  Solanes (1998) describes how in a public consultation for 
water legislation in South Africa, responses were received from industry but no comments were 
submitted by rural communities and village-level water committees.  Similarly, special interests can 
actively influence the choice of projects, which may sometimes have questionable economic benefits.   
  While most of the above examples demonstrate that participation can lead to better project 
outcomes, what do we know about how it occurs and how to achieve it?  Currently, mobilizing 
coordinating councils in river basin management, water user associations in irrigation, and water and 
sanitation associations in that sector are the recognized methods.  But that only pushes one to ask 
when do these associations work and not work?  When are people willing to come together and 
when not?  On that critical issue the understanding is much weaker.   
Equity and accountability are extremely important in the water sector where decentralization is 
supported because it is believed that thus far disadvantaged populations will somehow also benefit 
from the resource.  Legislation on property rights is one of the key aspects of reform to translate the 
above principles into practice because this defines the status of stakeholders, which in turn influences 
the success of participatory processes at the local level.   
Derman et al. (2000) highlight these concerns in a study on water sector reform in Zimbabwe.  
Integrated water management in Zimbabwe is based on the catchment or watershed.  A central 
organization, ZINWA, oversees Catchment and Subcatchment Councils, the former is responsible 
for planning and overall management while the latter have responsibilities ranging from water 
allocation, issuing of water permits, collection of data, assisting ZINWA with planning, and 
protecting the catchment.  They also embody channels for stakeholder involvement.  The 
Subcatchment Councils (SCCs) have fifteen members and all Subcatchment Councils are represented 
in the Catchment Councils (CCs).  
As in other African countries formerly under colonial rulers, water rights in Zimbabwe, for non-
primary or commercial uses are linked to land ownership.  More recent reforms are converting these 
permanent rights to permits which are issued are for specified time periods and purposes.  The new 
Water Act has declared all water, surface and groundwater, public and attempts to address the water 
requirements of the disadvantaged users through stakeholder participation.  An immediate problem 
to be overcome is that since many of these landowners were white farmers, the mostly black 
communal and small-farmers and primary water users, mostly women, are less likely to become 
permit holders and their participation is essential for decentralization to benefit them.  
The study reports partial success.  The drafting of the new Water Act of 1976 and the Zimbabwe 
National Water Authority Act that followed were based on dialogue with stakeholders.  However, the 
stakeholders consisted mainly of large water right holders, professionals and businesses which had 
vested interests in the formulation of the new policy.  Representation by small-scale, communal and 
resettlement farmers, is limited and raises equity concerns despite the formal establishment of 
councils.  These users depend on water from sources, such as, borewells and small dams, which are 
not a major focus of reform.  They are not a significant influential force because they are neither 
likely to be permit holders nor are they aware of new water laws and how they can voice their 
concerns.  Similarly, the special interests of women, for example, for irrigating vegetables are barely 
heard.   
Yet there has been progress in other areas.  For example, the stakeholders were able to succeed in 
getting ZINWA, the central organization, to legislate that four of its twenty one board members 
would be representatives from the Catchment Councils (CCs) which embody channels for 
stakeholder involvement.  In addition, a demand for another level below the Sub-Catchment 
Councils (SCCs) in order to reach people at the grassroots has been heeded and the associations are   14
allowed to form although no specific functions have been assigned to them as with the CCs and the 
SCCs.    
  The appointment of the River Basin or Catchment Manager, to oversee the administration 
of the CCs, raises questions about accountability.  The CCs can merely advice the manager but do 
not have any authority over the official or his staff.  The manager is only accountable to ZINWA 
which in turn is accountable to the Minister.  This suggests no real accountability to the stakeholders 
who elect Council members, who remain under central control though the manager. 
4. DECENTRALIZATION IN VARIOUS SECTORS 
This section summarizes decentralization in diverse sectors.  The template consists of listing the main 
functions in each sector and discussing which functions are more likely to be decentralized or 
continued to be centrally controlled.  The section will focus on implementation while presenting 
information, based on examples in the literature, on what is working and where the pitfalls are from 
the experience so far.    
The following sectors have been selected because commitment to decentralization has been declared 
as a matter of policy in these areas in many countries.  Intra-sectoral and intersectoral coordination is 
critical in health as it is in river basin management.  Education is interesting to river basins because in 
pursuing decentralization, the sector is also making a break from the traditional emphasis on 
standardization in favor of one that discards the one size fits all approach and promises multiple 
solutions to meet assorted goals.  Since river basins also differ in many ways, including size, aridity, 
availability of water, and hydrology to name a few, an understanding of the range of approaches in 
education may prove useful.  As in river basins, roads are part of networks and both sectors have to 
manage spillover effects.  Irrigation feeds directly into river basin management, being the dominant 
water user.  The sector is reviewed separately in view of the special focus on water user groups and 
participation.  Anti-poverty programs through light on how benefits can reach those sections of the 
population that may be marginalized even by local governments.  Finally, delivery of infrastructure 
services is relevant to river basins in view of issues relating to economies of scale, regulation, and 
how costs can be recovered.  Lessons about aspects such as financing and management capabilities 
may be gathered from all these sectors.         
Education 
Rules set out in the constitution, or instituted through legislation, and regulations, define the 
framework within which the education system works.  The principle of subsidiarity is about changing 
the rules so that decisions can be taken where the action in question is located, provided the ability to 
take responsibility for the decision-outcomes exists (McGinn and Welsh, 1999 and Davies and 
Hentschke, 1994).  Organizations at lower levels that can take decisions related to education include 
the field offices within the education ministry, state government, parent-teacher association, school 
administration, board or council, and the municipal government.   
Objectives for decentralization in education 
Decentralization in education is undertaken for reasons similar to those in other sectors.     
Specifically, to relieve the financial burden of central governments, to increase efficiency in providing 
educational services by allowing lower level organizations to take decisions.  Efficiency and 
effectiveness are enhanced when decisions are made based on local requirements and available 
resources.  Further, by transferring day-to-day and other administrative tasks to lower levels 
expensive delays may be avoided making service provision more cost effective and timely.  Lastly, 
decentralization is desired to have an inclusive policy so that the preferences of hitherto 
disadvantaged sections of society are also considered.   
Although everyone is affected by education in one form or the other, stakeholders are generally those 
who receive education and their parents, those who provide any inputs such as books, buildings and 
other materials for the educational process to take place, teachers, their training institutions,   15
principals and others who are directly involved in running the school system, those who employ the 
skills that education provides to generate profit, and finally political parties and taxpayers. 
The response of stakeholders to decentralization depends on what the specific objectives and policies 
are and how they benefit from it.  For example, publishers of text books may prefer more centralized 
choice of course materials in order to take advantage of economies of scale in their production.  
Where access to even primary education is limited parents, students, and potential employers support 
decentralization policies that focus on more expanded coverage of primary education.  Employers 
seeking highly skilled workers may prefer to endorse more high quality training at the expense of 
greater coverage, given limited funding.  Taxpayers and political parties simply want to see public 
funds being used more efficiently and would support decentralization policies for that reason. 
Functions and decisions 
The functions and associated decisions in the education sector may be broadly classified as (1) 
establishing basic norms such as minimum schooling requirements and structure of the system, (2) 
curriculum and teaching methods, (3) evaluation, examinations and supervision, (4) teacher training, 
staff salaries, transfers and assignment, (5) sources and budgeting of recurrent expenditure, and (6) 
capital expenditure for construction of buildings and facilities (Ahmad, 1992). 
Education systems range along a continuum of mostly centrally controlled to largely decentralized 
arrangements with a wide range of combinations of centralized and decentralized responsibilities in 
between.  Of these functions, school organization is almost always under central control.  Other 
functions may be carried out locally but  under centrally specified norms.  For example, examinations 
may be designed centrally but administered and assessed through field offices.  Alternatively, the 
appointments of teachers chosen by local school boards may be approved by the ministry of 
education.   
In more decentralized systems, functions other than those pertaining to school organization are taken 
up at local levels in a variety of ways.  Primary and secondary education is controlled by state or 
municipal governments in Mexico and Colombia.  In Australia, elected councils are responsible for 
primary education.  Chile relies on charter schools while private schools are encouraged in Pakistan 
in recent years (Malpica Faustor, 1994; Ahmad, 1992).  In current practice, central finance plays a 
prominent role in most countries.  Further, education has to compete with other sectors for regional 
or state government contributions.  For example, these may be matching funds for school 
construction or revenue budgeted for recurrent expenditure. 
Centralization and decentralization in the education sector 
The past century saw the formation of many national governments especially in developing countries 
emerging from colonialism and the strengthening of existing ones around the world.  The nature of 
these political transformations was such that strong centralized control of most sectors, including 
education, seemed the logical step to organizing necessary services and to put administrative 
structures into place as quickly as possible.  The guiding principle was efficient management in a 
manner that achieved as much coverage as possible with existing resources.   
In education, this reasoning translated to standardizing curricula and procedures so as to extend the 
facility to as many as possible.  Standardization allowed economies of scale in the production of 
inputs and guaranteed a relatively uniform, high quality product.  This became manifest as similar 
course materials, standards and conduct of examinations, and teacher qualifications.  Besides, the 
simultaneous growth of urban centers also promoted scale economies.  Countries that centrally 
controlled education had more students enrolled and good quality education when compared to 
others.  Theories of what helped to enhance the learning process could be uniformly applied by a 
system where the decision was taken by the ministry of education.  However, central governments 
were neither able to expand coverage fast enough nor maintain good quality to satisfy demand from 
growing populations.  For example, the large demand for education that goes unmet and the poor 
attendance of teachers in rural areas is viewed as a failure of the centralized system (PROBE, 1999).   
Standardization is now viewed as the main drawback in the education system because it dissuades 
local managers from using local information to modify the rules to reach targets more efficiently and 
to enable smooth functioning of the institutions.  McGinn and Welsh, (1999) suggest that   16
decentralization in education means “groups of social actors attempting to control education to serve 
their unique objectives.” Technological advances in communication, especially the internet, now 
present new possibilities to revitalize the education sector.  
A central debate in education is whether an elected body accountable to the community is qualified 
to take responsibility or do decision-makers have to be education professionals knowledgeable about 
the sector?  The underlying assumption is that there are some “best practices”, known to education 
professionals, which guarantee services at acceptable levels, when implemented.  The decentralization 
argument is that if local non-experts are somehow trained to take some of the decisions that experts 
can take then the political process will yield the same results.  For example, Govinda (1999) describes 
the Lok Jumbish project in India, where women and other previously marginalized village members 
were brought into the process of decision-making and established a new political decision-making 
process for education.  Further, if high standards have to be met to survive then local decision-
makers will take appropriate steps irrespective of whether they are education experts or not.  The 
pressure may come from market forces as with private schools or from central supervision and 
evaluation that demands that performance meet some minimum criteria, as for example, with 
publicly funded private schools.   
In systems where professional experts manage education, authority is usually deconcentrated from 
the ministry of education to representative offices at the state or district level.  In Argentina, there are 
ministries of education in each of its 24 provinces.  Otherwise the system may depend on school-
based management, as in Los Angeles, USA (McGinn and Welsh, 1999).  Here, the principal has 
ultimate responsibility which may or may not be shared with teachers.  The success of this strategy 
depends on incentives to perform, the ability of those involved and the quality of supervision.  The 
community participates in this system through parent teacher organizations and is generally 
concerned with fund-raising activities for school projects, such as, building facilities and supplies of 
materials including computers.  Decisions about the curriculum and staff related matters are retained 
by the professionals.  McGinn and Welsh (1999) argue that in homogeneous societies with a high 
degree of training, there would be a convergence between control by professionals and political 
appointees. 
School councils or boards, composed of principal, teachers, parents and sometimes students exist in 
many countries, such as Australia, Nicaragua, and New Zealand.  Although the distribution of 
authority between schools and councils differs across countries, the central idea is community 
control through elected council members with sufficient autonomy for schools. The composition of 
the council or board determines the degree of control by professionals.  Similarly, the political 
composition of the council could have equity implications especially if one group dominates all 
others.           
Champions of free market forces suggest that elected officials only reflect the majority view even if 
election procedures were fair while proposals by professional experts do not cater to everyone’s 
needs as would market competition.  Under a free market system, on the other hand, only those 
schools offering the most desired programs would be funded and thrive while others would be 
driven out by lack of demand for them.   
Schools in a free market system may be private or public. The main feature in this system is that 
consumers may choose from a range of options available to them.  The range in question may exist 
in the form of a variety of curriculum offerings, quality of teachers and instructional materials within 
the public school system itself.  Alternatively, private groups or cooperatives may be contracted to 
run schools using public subsidies.  This is the case with charter schools in New Zealand and Chile 
(Perris, 1998; McGinn and Welsh, 1999).  The schools control their budget and also staffing and may 
or may not decide on the curriculum, although they do need to achieve specified educational 
standards.  Communities in some African countries (Mali, Burkina Faso) have set up schools in 
villages by designing their own curriculum and using local teachers with the help of non-
governmental organizations (DeStefano, 1996) 
Private schools contribute to primary and secondary education in many countries, as for example, in 
India and Pakistan.  In this form of decentralization private schools may be privately funded and   17
completely autonomous or publicly subsidized but privately run, as in Belgium, with or without 
funding through fees (McGinn and Welsh, 1999).  The purpose is to offer schooling to all sections of 
society even if the strategy is sometimes inefficient, as with schools in remote areas.  There is little 
scope for community participation in schools that are privately owned and the focus of management 
is usually to maximize revenue. 
Key requirements for successful decentralization in the education sector 
For successful decentralization it is a key requirement for local authorities to be capable decision-
makers. It is a different skill from being able to effectively carry out decisions handed down from 
above.  In practice, central governments retain control of curricula and criteria for award of degrees 
in order to maintain uniform standards.  This may mean that the qualifications and training necessary 
for teachers are also centrally determined because teachers have to impart the knowledge contained 
in the chosen curricula. Decentralization in education, on the other hand, implies diversity by 
definition.  Decisions relating to choice of teaching materials, conducting tests and examinations, 
guidelines for instructions, time-tables, maintenance of building facilities, and sometimes even 
curriculum may be taken at lower levels rather than by central authorities, who are too remote to be 
aware of the needs in the sphere of activity.  Similarly, decisions concerning the fundamental rules, 
such as, what accomplishments qualify for a degree, student-teacher ratio, and number of school days 
in the year are also suited to local consideration.   
Other decisions including those related to class sizes and criteria for admissions are dependent on 
finances.  Although these decisions may be made locally, financial sources and budgeting may or may 
not be determined locally.  As with health, both central and state contributions are used for 
education and must compete with other sectors for fiscal support.   Private schools depend largely on 
user fees and are financially unaffordable for middle and lower income groups resulting in disparities 
in the quality of education imparted, as has been observed in Pakistan (Ahmad, 1992).     
If the goals are greater coverage, suitability of skills to potential, particularly local employers, and 
efficiency, then encouraging local management is essential.  Local managers, including school 
administrators, must be taught how to select curricula so that the authority to set curricula, and other 
related decisions involving training local teachers and selecting text books may all be transferred to 
them.                                                                                                                                                                                      
In the education sector, one strong source of resistance is from teachers.  Teachers oppose authority 
to appoint and fire staff being vested in non-professionals because they fear political interference and 
corruption.   Similar concerns about corruption are expressed with respect to setting of pay scales 
and promotions.  Besides, it is practical to assign the authority to transfer teachers to those who have 
an overview of the distribution in the nation or state or district as the case may be.    
  Another concern is that of sustaining interest in discharging the new managerial and 
decision-making duties in addition to those normally associated with instruction.  For example, in 
systems based on school-based management, teachers find decision-making responsibilities too 
burdensome and allow principals to exercise all the authority.  This is reinforced by the fact that 
principals may be held accountable for performance.  Hanson, (1995) cites instances in Spain where 
teachers are not enthusiastic about being elected as principals for the above stated reasons. 
Healthcare 
As in education the pattern of health system organization is linked to the kind of government and 
political ideology that exists at the centre and decentralization is espoused for a variety of reasons.  
For example, decentralization in the health system in Mexico and in Papua New Guinea came about 
because the goals of decentralization are a matter of national policy in all sectors.  In Mexico, a 
country with a federal structure, decentralization originated in a need to balance power among the 
center, states and municipal governments (Gutierrez in Mills et al, 1993).  In Papua New Guinea, a 
country whose population is widely dispersed over several offshore islands and with over 500 
languages, decentralization was a way to enhance interaction between the government and its citizens 
(Reilly in Mills et al, 1993).     18
Hanson et al. (1997) emphasize the importance of context to trigger and guide reform.    In  a 
study of 8 African country experiences in the health sector, they find the health sector had reached a 
point of breakdown in all the countries studied.  Benin’s public health centers faced an acute shortage 
of drugs between 1983 and 1985 and Lusaka, in Zambia, witnessed cases of cholera between1990 
and 1991.  Under these conditions, reformers began to test pilot projects on a small-scale with local 
and external assistance.  However, it was changes in the larger political context that provided 
opportunities for health sector reform on a large scale.  New governments were eager to be perceived 
as harbingers of positive change especially in depressed health sectors.  At the same time health 
sector reforms could be debated and discussed drawing on the experience of the small-scale 
experiments and guided in new directions.  The arrival of a new health minister in Guinea 
encouraged heightened debate and progress with reforms.  The changes embarked upon received 
further credibility due to the BI declaration4 at the World Health Organization Regional Health 
Ministers’ meeting on decentralized health systems in 1987.  Strengthening of weak local structures, 
making local government responsible and accountable to its constituents, and at a practical level, to 
improve the management of logistics, coverage and quality of service are the expectations from this 
approach.    
Objectives for decentralization in healthcare 
Improving coordination, increasing local control, and cutting costs are the three most important 
strategies of decentralization in the health sector.  Primary health care may be maximized within a 
defined geographical area, especially if it is one that coincides with an administrative area, such as a 
district (referred to geographic decentralization).  This is to ensure intrasectoral coordination among 
various aspects of health ranging from family health and nutrition, to mother and child care and 
disease control.  Coordination may also be achieved with complimentary services in other sectors, 
such as, maintenance of social hygiene in terms of clean water, sanitation and waste disposal.   
Further, coordination must occur among governmental and nongovernmental organizations and 
private providers.   
  Improvement in the quality and quantity of health care is to materialize through local control 
of day-to-day activities, including decisions concerning staff, facilities, community financing, and 
resource allocation, particularly with respect to primary health care.  Local control is organized 
through a variety of bodies, including independent hospital administrations, advisory councils, and 
separate boards and directorates for specialized care, such as, preventive health, disability, and 
environmental health. 
  Cost cutting may come from organizing the health system to minimize service duplication, 
especially with respect to those services provided by secondary and tertiary health care facilities so 
that they are more uniformly distributed to cater to the health needs of demarcated areas. Local 
management is expected to increase efficiency by utilizing scarce resources to address locally specific 
health concerns.  Some of the financial resources are to be released by tailoring central staff 
requirements to emphasize planning, regulatory and technical advisory functions and reducing the 
number assigned to administrative duties.  With greater community control, some local financing 
could also be raised.   
  Paradoxically, unlike in the education sector, where standardization calls for more central 
control, decentralization is seen as a way to urge more equality and uniformity among regions and 
between rural and urban areas in the provision and standard of health care services.  In many 
instances, health sector reform leading to a decentralized structure has actually unified previously 
disparate parts in the process.  In Chile, The National Health Service of the 1950s was a state run 
organization, geographically decentralized for administrative purposes (Montoya-Aguilar and 




4 The Bamako Initiative (BI) refers to an endorsement by African Ministers of Health at the World Health 
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Vaughan in Mills et al., 1990). This organization covered health care for blue collar workers and 
unemployed people, and along with another agency called The National Medical Service for 
Employees became the National Health Fund in 1979.  About this time decentralization began to 
take shape as private provision of health care was being encouraged to relieve the state of some of its 
financial burden.  Since then, the health system has evolved so that there are four levels of 
management with distinct functions.  
Functions and decisions 
The main functions of the health sector encompass policymaking, planning and legislation, allocation 
of financial and other resources to programs, management of health sector activities including 
personnel matters, budgeting, procurement of medicines, equipment and other supplies, hygiene and 
maintenance, billing and scheduling.  Other responsibilities include staff training, disseminating 
information about programs, such as, family planning, rehabilitation of drug and alcohol users etc.  
Most notably, the functions are intra (as among different health services) and inter sectoral (as among 
health, water and sanitation, education, transport, and welfare programs) coordination.  In addition, 
regulation and integration of the activities of nongovernmental sectors and private providers so that 
they meet the standard of service are equally important.   
Centralization and decentralization in the healthcare sector 
Nations are not similar in the mix of centralized and decentralization functions they adopt in the 
organization of their health system but the following paragraph briefly summarizes general 
observations.  In many countries, legislation, planning, and regulatory functions remain in central 
control.  In more devolved systems, as in Mexico, Spain, and Papua New Guinea, governments at 
lower levels (state or provincial departments) may have the authority to perform these functions, but 
with central supervision.  The most decentralized functions are those that reduce the financial burden 
on the central government and those that relieve central office staff from decisions concerning the 
day-to-day activities relating to service provision, particularly where local staff is more aware of the 
circumstances and also to avoid unnecessary delay in responses.  These functions are management, 
intersectoral and intrasectoral coordination, and organizing community participation.   
The extent to which other functions, such as, budgeting and allocation of resources, staff training, 
local planning and fund-raising  are carried out is determined by the form of and degree to which 
decentralization has advanced.  For example: in Zambia, day-to-day management of responsibilities is 
delegated to the semiautonomous Central Board of Health, from the Ministry of Health.  Other 
functions are deconcentrated as the Ministry of Health administers health care through its district 
level offices and local health boards Bossert et al (2000).  The system allows local control to a limited 
extent.  Some items such as expenditures, fees, and contracting can be decided upon at the district 
level but others relating to staffing and salaries are not within their purview.  Coordination from the 
perspective of a national health plan remains centralized.  In a deconcentrated approach, the ministry 
of health is usually involved in negotiating with the central government, social security and health 
insurance organizations and in allocating resources to lower levels, especially with respect to large 
capital investments like major hospitals or medical research institutes.  Sometimes the allocation of 
resources may be delegated to a separate agency, as with the National Health Fund in Chile. 
The planning function itself can be mostly autonomous or deconcentrated to a small extent.  The 
local government may devise a strategy for all public services that it is responsible for and design 
programs for implementation in the health sector on that basis.  On the other hand, local planning 
may be done within central guidelines with approval sought for some or all of the projects.  A 
deconcentrated version is to simply implement a central plan or get central approval for desired 
projects.  In India, Chile, Mexico, and the U.S.A. plans and decisions on capital projects at lower 
levels are formulated based on central or regional guidelines and the finances available.  Planning and 
budgeting are usually decentralized to the same extent so that sufficient financial support for 
programs is assured.   
When faced with the question of what level to decentralize to, policymakers have to balance four 
conditions (Mills et al, 1990). The number of levels should be within a conceivable budget, so that 
available financial resources are not overstretched.  Some services, like hospitals with specialized   20
services, are viable only if there is a large enough jurisdiction for potentially sufficient demand.  On 
the other hand, the number of levels has to be large enough that decentralization is close to the grass 
roots level for community participation.  But too many levels could go beyond the supervisory 
capacities of higher levels.   
In order to accommodate these considerations, the lowest administrative level, typically the district is 
chosen to which authority is decentralized and supported by a number of councils, health 
committees and other bodies to promote community participation. Alternatively, the local power 
structure itself consists of a number of government bodies that represent the interests from the 
grassroots level upwards.  The district level, however, is too small to support a hospital with 
specialized services.  So, the next higher administrative level, the region or province, is selected to 
situate hospitals with more advanced care to cater to referrals from all the districts below it.  The 
regional level is found to be the most viable because of the high level of management expertise and 
timely assistance from other sectors that are necessary to operate the hospitals.  In this instance, the 
regional level is stronger than the district level, to which authority is generally deconcentrated rather 
than devolved.    
An important question is about who is represented on the governing bodies as this determines the 
degree to which decisions are influenced by the community and to what extent the members may be 
held accountable.  If authority is devolved to the local government then the decision makers are 
elected officials.  If authority is deconcentrated to local health committees as in Chile, or to hospital 
management boards as in Sri Lanka, then members may represent providers like charitable or 
nongovernmental organizations, prominent citizens, activists, health professionals, or local 
government officials.  Their contribution could range from being purely advisory, to planning, and 
even fundraising. These governing bodies strengthen the mechanism at the district level by debating 
issues of local interest as inputs to planning and management and assisting in coordinating health 
care activities at that level.  If the members are all elected then they would be accountable to the 
voters otherwise they are not.   
One problem faced with community participation is that of capture of governing bodies by local elite 
as experienced in India and Papua New Guinea.  In Senegal, for example, opposing political interests 
at the center are sometimes replicated in health committees.  The effect of this depends on whether 
the dominant voices are those in support of the political party at the center or against it (NDiaye in 
Mills et al., 1990).   
Implementation issues in the health sector 
The process of decentralization begins when the principle of decentralization has been formally 
adopted by the national government through edicts or decrees.  Subsequent to this step, the ministry 
of health generally undertakes the task of identifying functions that can be devolved or 
deconcentrated to lower levels, within the framework where the government has authority.   If some 
health services, such as, family planning activities, are to be privatized or delegated to private 
providers, then the central government will have to legislate to integrate their role into the 
decentralization scheme.  Making the changes will mean investing in new health care centers, 
teaching hospitals, and institutes for medical research, in order to provide the necessary tools in 
regions and districts.  As this stage reaches a critical mass, the national health system emerges as the 
rules, roles and responsibilities are assigned and boards, councils, and committees are established to 
promote coordination and realization of the objectives.  All this takes time, skills, and resources.   
Hanson et al. (1997) describe health sector decentralization in West and Central Africa as 
“incremental, non-linear and long-term”.  In Zambia, steps in fiscal decentralization and founding of 
new institutions were taken faster than those relating to drug programs.  An interesting observation is 
that there is a phase during which both the old and new systems co-exist.  In Mali, workers felt more 
secure to be employed by government paid health centers rather than those funded by the 
community, resulting in difficulties in hiring workers for the latter.  Experience in many countries 
points to the following major obstacles that local governments are faced with when decentralizing 
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(1) While devolution of power fulfills a key demand of decentralization, successful implementation is 
compromised by inadequate financial resources.  Even if the local government has the authority to 
raise revenue, their tax base is usually insufficient to support health and other programs.  The 
potential for increased revenue from property, land, entertainment tax, and licensing is limited.  Local 
government, therefore, has to depend on financial transfers from the center, whose revenue comes 
from sales tax, customs, and excise duties.  
(2) Local governments are not completely independent from central control because of their financial 
dependence on central funds.  If these are in the form of block grants they are not earmarked for any 
purpose.  Alternatively, they may be transfers targeted to specific programs, as with projects to 
control malaria, in India. From the national perspective allocation methods could be used to promote 
critical programs, like family planning, or to control the spread of a communicable disease like SARS 
in China.  Further, central allocation may be used to reduce regional differences in the level of health 
care.  Unfortunately, regions or states with political interests that are aligned with the center may 
receive preferential treatment through the allocation procedure.  However, in many decentralized 
systems both central and state contributions are divided among local governments usually taking the 
population base into account.  How much of its collection the local government may keep is a much 
debated issue.   
Financial inadequacy is a hurdle even in Chile where health sector decentralization is relatively 
advanced.  Gideon (2001) describes the experience of a center in the low-income neighborhood of El 
Bosque.  The municipality has refused to contribute financial resources and expensive equipment 
remains unused due to lack of recurring supplies.  The new system of fiscal decentralization is based 
on a per capita system of funding.  However, due to insufficient information especially about the 
actual number of beneficiaries, many municipalities underestimate the total cost and the amount 
budgeted by the Ministry of Health for the purpose falls far short of actual expenses.  The 
municipality is expected to fill the gap but health has to compete with other sectors for resources.  As 
may be expected, the problem is exacerbated in poorer neighborhoods, like El Bosque, than in more 
well to do ones, introducing disparity in the quality of services at family health centers. Oddly 
enough, a system that was set up specifically to reduce inequalities among municipalities is 
unfortunately failing to do so because administrative decentralization has taken place in isolation 
without fiscal and political decentralization to support it.   
  Bossert et al (2000) stress the necessity to include household incomes in the formula for 
transparent allocation of grants to districts.  In Zambia, where district level services are financed 
through a combination of grants and collection of fees, allocation of grants to districts is based on 
population but not household income levels.  So, although the poorer districts did receive larger 
grants they could not raise sufficient income from fees thereby causing disparity among district level 
services.   
  In developing countries, uncertainty of adequate finances for long term capital projects, at 
lower levels is a particularly serious problem.  In Senegal, for example, the community (through the 
health committee) may spend 50% of its revenue on drugs and capital investments but it is restricted 
from raising funds for operational costs.  Currently they manage with external aid (NDiaye in Mills et 
al., 1990).   
  Another major hurdle experienced by many countries is the acute shortage of skills.  The 
dearth of planning skills required for reorganizing the health sector so that programs can be carried 
out at the lower levels is experienced at the ministry of health itself.  Staff at the lower levels has to 
be prepared, willing, and able to accept authority.  In addition to management and administrative 
skills, some knowledge of planning and programming is also necessary if decentralization involves 
devolution.  For example, the study on Zambia (Bossert et al, 2000) notes those guidelines for 
expenditures relating to personnel allowance, drugs, fuel, and capital were efficiently implemented at 
the district level, but not in contracting for hospital services which requires more experience.  In the 
early stages, considerable technical help and support has to be provided by the ministry of health.  In 
Congo and Senegal, program managers from the center provided an important source of experienced 
staff for training activities (Hanson et al., 1997).   22
  Opposition from entrenched staff has to be overcome.  Instead, staff commitment to the 
goals of decentralization must be won through training for any progress to occur. The civil service, 
for example, sees their independence and authority eroded by the empowerment of local groups as 
has been recorded in Sri Lanka (Rondinelli, 1983).  Similarly, the concerns of those who believe they 
are adversely affected by the changes due to decentralization must be addressed.  In eight African 
countries studied by Hanson et al. (1997) authorities had to persuade private pharmacies that their 
urban market base was not being shrunk by the decentralized health centers, whose top priority was 
efficient programs for the procurement of essential drugs.  
  Decentralization affects the relationship of health workers with the community.  While 
training and better services enhance their standing in the community, it comes at a cost in terms of a 
greatly increased workload, most often with no salary improvements.  On the other hand, health 
workers view their influence over patients as being eroded by community management.  In Congo, 
refusal by doctors to accept treatment protocols supervised by heath committees was overcome by 
having them design the protocols themselves.  In this way they could continue to be respected by 
their patients as the authorities on medical care.  
  Long-term commitment to voluntary (unpaid) work as members of health committees is 
uncertain as has been observed in Benin and Guinea (Hanson et al., 1997). While the health sector 
deals with other questions, such as, how to provide health care to those who cannot afford to pay for 
the services, the above obstacles are identified as the major issues in decentralization.    
Gains from decentralization 
Thus far, studies have reported gains ranging from (1) a large increase in the number of health units 
and hospital beds, (2) more coverage, in terms of primary health care and medicines, for the 
uninsured and unemployed, (3) building construction, renovations, and extensions, (4) 
standardization of salaries for health workers (Mexico).  Others, such as the study on Zambia, 
Bossert et al (2000) suggest that there have been no significant improvements attributable to 
decentralization although maintaining health utilization rates for health services in spite of general 
economic decline and increase in HIV/AIDS, may be credited to the reforms.    
Roads    
Decentralization in the road sector is more complicated than in other infrastructure sectors because 
(1) roads are useful only as part of a network and not on their own, (2) there is little control over the 
level of traffic including pedestrians, or the total load that impacts it (Robinson and Stiedl (2001).   
According to Humplick and Moini-Araghi (1996a), there are two factors that influence service 
delivery: (1) technical characteristics and (2) diversity of demand which reflects the different 
expectations that users have of what roads should do for them.  Further, construction involves large 
lump sum investments for inputs, machinery and equipment, therefore, this function benefits from 
economies of scale.  If construction activities are localized then we see more contracting out to the 
private sector (Lopez-de-Silanes et al, 1995 provides evidence of this in the US).  Even in this case, 
procurement skills and supervision are required and the center is considered better equipped for 
these activities.  But maintenance is labor-intensive and periodic so decentralization might be 
preferable in this function.  This point, however, is refuted by Robinson and Steidel (2001) in the 
context of rural roads because of the keen management skills required.   
Objectives for decentralization in the road sector 
Decentralization is expected to prevent decision-making bottlenecks experienced under central 
control by increasing understanding of local conditions and relieving central departments of routine 
operational duties and decisions so that they can focus on planning and policy work.  More control at 
the local level, allowing diverse views to be represented, may lead to more innovative solutions to 
problems and result in expansion of the area covered by the service. 
Functions and decisions 
Important tasks constituting delivery of road infrastructure are construction, rehabilitation, 
maintenance, and administration.  The corresponding functions for providers are planning, selection, 
and management.  Administration of roads refers to decisions about where to make investments,   23
how to procure works and monitoring quality of construction and maintenance.  Cost minimization 
is a key concern in this sector.   
The roles and responsibilities in the road sector may be summarized as follows (Madelin and 
Parkman, 1999; Robinson and Stiedl, 2001):  The role of owner, generally, ministry of transport or 
works, consists of setting road policy, establishing the legal and regulatory framework for 
management of road networks, and for funding the programs.  The administrator, a road authority or 
agency, ensures that the road policy is being carried out as envisioned.  Often the administrator’s 
duties are clubbed with those of the manager, who actually plans the activities, supervises, and 
monitors the operations.  This function can be contracted out to private consultants.  Contractors 
carry out the operations.  Contracts can involve public or private sector and are specific to particular 
tasks.  Alternatively, responsibility may be assigned within the public sector so that an agency can 
carry out tasks within an agreed upon framework. 
Centralization and decentralization in the road sector  
Decentralization is possible in the road sector broadly along the following lines: In a deconcentrated 
model the central government is the owner and administrator otherwise these roles are devolved to 
the local government (e.g. district).  In either model, the role of the administrator may be delegated 
to the private sector.  The central government and local government may enter into agency 
arrangements with each other or the local government as owner may appoint a committee of local 
members to act as administrator for it.  The manager and contractor’s roles can be undertaken by the 
private sector or performed by a department within the administrator’s office (Robinson and Stiedl, 
2001). 
In two studies, Humplick and Moini-Araghi (1996a, 1996b) throw light on which functions are more 
cost-efficient under decentralization.  They define resource costs as those related to provision (cost 
of inputs to production, management and administration) and preference costs as those related to the 
perceptions of and impact on road users.  When conditions are bad then the cost to users is high and 
the demand is low and vice versa.  Resource costs are identified with efficiency objectives and 
preference costs with equity considerations.  Based on a comparison of eight countries, they 
conclude that decentralization increases costs at first due to loss of scale economies and later 
becomes more efficient when roadwork is more in local control, although there are costs to collective 
decision-making.  Decentralization, functional and fiscal, is examined in construction, maintenance, 
and administration by comparing resource and preference costs.  
In construction, the best approach is to take advantage of economies of scale, which the authors 
argue, is either through complete decentralization or complete centralization.  Resource cost 
efficiency will depend on degree of competition among bidders and not to level of decentralization.  
Preference costs are lowest when decentralization is complete, that is, users receive what they want.      
In theory, decentralization is good for maintenance activities (relative to construction) because locals 
choose their preferences and success depends on accountability, and local involvement.  But even 
here the results are mixed.  Maintenance of roads is most efficient under complete decentralization 
when both functional and fiscal decisions are decentralized (as in Indonesia and USA).  However, if 
financing, procurement and management are centrally determined and implementation of 
maintenance is functionally decentralized, then incentives to minimize costs are not high at the local 
level.  The authors cite the example of Germany, where minimizing preference costs appears to have 
a higher priority than minimizing resource costs in road maintenance, perhaps so that all areas have 
uniformly good road conditions. Utilization of the centrally allotted earmarked funds is not efficient 
with respect to provision of maintenance although preference costs are low.  
Another determining factor for efficient road maintenance is adequate local skill levels.  Colombia 
has performed poorly despite functional decentralization and earmarked funds.  When local skills are 
insufficient, maintenance activities are awarded to private contractors.  Under this scenario, efficiency   24
gains in maintenance are more dependent on enough competition in bidding procedures than in 
whether it is being done at the central or local levels, especially if administered by the center.  Lack of 
competition5 is a concern at the local level more than at the center.  On the other hand, the link 
between public expenditure and road maintenance is less clear to local citizens under fiscal 
decentralization than when they make choices themselves, even when using earmarked funds.     
Central governments have a key role in administration especially in regulating safety and network 
externalities and maintain their control through partial funding of administration.  In administrative 
decentralization (measured as the fiscal share of local government in administrative works), 
preference costs are lowest when providers can be held accountable to users but this is difficult 
because there are costs to ensure users are well informed. In Korea decentralized administration 
lowered preference costs showing that local involvement in decision-making about road expenditures 
improves road conditions. 
The conclusion is that ultimately which functions are best decentralized depends on the structure of 
allocation of fiscal and functional authority.  In poorer countries central governments should 
produce, plan, and budget, and manage hiring of labor and machinery.  This is especially the case 
with construction.   
Problems in decentralizing the road sector 
The problems faced by the rural road sector suggest the reasons limiting improvement in roads, by 
transferring authority to the local levels.  Hurdles specific to road administration include (1) not 
being able to attract international consultants for district projects because of their small-scale; (2) 
having to depend on labor-only contracts for maintenance, technology for which is not always 
supported locally; (3) lack of special skills needed for network-based  planning; (4) recognizing the 
importance of maintenance to keep costs low; (5) being able to match available options, including 
low cost methods to spot repair roads and to choose road standards, appropriate to the use they will 
be put to, in order to keep overall costs down (Robinson and Stiedl, 2001). 
In field studies of Uganda, Nepal, and Zambia, Robinson and Stiedl (2001) report a lack of 
accountability mechanisms between central and local governments and between local governments 
and the communities.  Monitoring of activities by the private sector is usually carried out by central 
authorities and there are no avenues for users to signal their assessment.  Neither is the use of funds 
transparent.   
Not enough authority is transferred to the district level so that local decision-makers can be flexible 
with the limited resources available.  For example, if they want to demand maintenance instead of 
new roads.  Insufficient political clout with the center is a problem especially when there is still a lot 
of dependence on the center for planning, funds and technical support. 
Another problem is that contracting for district projects with international consultants is difficult 
because they are small-scale.  Attempts to expand the size of the project by including other districts, 
takes away local control, as for example in Zambia.  In Uganda, district officials do not feel involved 
because small-scale maintenance projects are carried out on the basis of labor-only contracts 
administered locally.   
Decentralization seems to give authority to locals who lack the management skills necessary for 
maintenance of rural roads.  Except for involvement by engineers in external projects, there are few 
opportunities for training to enhance the limited capacity leaving local governments leaning on 
technical support from the center.  Skills, needed to manage new construction and development, are 
quite different from those needed for maintenance. In Nepal, district committees are unsure about 
how to implement the Road Master Plan. 




5 When implementing projects under the decentralized set up in Kerala, India, although the services of 
contractors were sought only as a last resort, to avoid corruption, in reality many beneficiary committees had 
contractors or their nominees as the conveners (Sharma, 2003).   25
Zambia is the only case where there is legislation in place that recognizes the importance of 
maintenance to retain road standards.  In Nepal, however, there is a tendency not to budget for the 
maintenance of roads that can rein in costs, and to focus instead on construction and repairs which 
are more expensive.  Sometimes roads are built where they are not economically worthwhile.  Also, 
the standard of the road is unnecessarily high.  For example, some of the main roads are of lower 
standard than that of the tributary roads that feed into them.  Overall planning does not appear to 
contemplate less expensive options such as spot repairs to provide access within the limited budget 
reflecting poor planning. 
Results from decentralization in the road sector 
Brazil, Philippines and Indonesia are all centralized with respect to road construction and 
maintenance.   Argentina, Colombia and Germany are more decentralized.  United States is most 
decentralized in this sector. Brazil’s per unit costs of provision are lower than in other countries due 
to restructuring of the construction sector yet roads are in poor condition in the provinces and 
municipalities due to lack of financial and skill resources to assume new roles (Humplick and Moini-
Araghi, 1996). 
Robinson and Stiedl (2001) report that decentralization of roads administration is not effective in 
improving rural road access for the poor because they are not involved in planning, financing, and 
implementation and there is no way to know what they need.  Few opportunities for employment are 
generated by construction and maintenance in the road sector at the district level.   
The authors recommend devolved and delegated models where the road networks are large enough 
to take advantage of economies of scale; or bottom-up principal agency with the local government 
owner having an agency agreement with the center; and the establishment of a system for allocating 
funds for district roads as a share of a central Road Fund as existed in Zambia.  With the road fund 
approach, however, local governments lose control over allotting expenditures.  Capacity building 
and reliable source of funds even through user fees are other significant prerequisites to reap benefits 
from decentralization.   
Irrigation sector 
Current trends around the world suggest that governments lack the financial and other resources to 
supply and maintain irrigation infrastructure, water delivery, and extension services to irrigators.  But 
irrigated agriculture is considered essential for food security in the coming decades.  The agricultural 
sector, particularly irrigation, is the largest consumer of water, a finite natural resource for which 
multiple users compete.  For all these reasons it has become imperative that agricultural productivity 
levels are maintained or increased through sustainable irrigated agriculture within the financial 
capabilities of governments, and most importantly, to ensure that water is efficiently allocated and 
used.   
In pursuit of these objectives, decentralization is taking place in irrigation through the transfer of 
management responsibilities to farmer groups or Water User Associations (WUAs) in several 
countries.  WUAs maintain on-farm small irrigated canals, allocate water among their members, 
collect revenues, and represent farmers’ interests to the irrigation authority.  They also serve to 
resolve conflicts that arise from complaints by farmers, especially with respect to allocation issues 
(Hamdy, 2002). 
  When discussing the impacts of irrigation management transfer, Vermillion (1997) cites 
studies in the Philippines, Indonesia, Mexico, and Sri Lanka, which report a fall in government 
expenditure for operation and maintenance.  The savings are potentially available to defray 
infrastructure construction and rehabilitation costs.  A large part of the savings to the government 
comes from staff reduction in irrigation agencies with allocative functions being taken over by the 
WUAs.  Further, governments aim at recovering at least the operation and maintenance costs, and in 
some instances, a part of the capital costs, of supplying water.  Sometimes farmers also contribute 
labor to maintenance activities.   
  WUAs support themselves through income from irrigation fees, membership fees, revenue 
from the supply of goods and services such as, contract machinery hire, fines, interest, and   26
donations.  Transfer programs can claim to be quite successful in cost recovery.  Comparison of 
collection rates between government run schemes and the Irrigation Associations (IAs) in Turkey 
illustrates this point.  In reimbursable irrigation schemes managed by the State Hydraulic Works 
(DSI), investment costs and O & M expenditures cannot be charged for recovery until ten years after 
project completion.  The O & M costs of the previous year are charged the following year without 
being adjusted for inflation (although the inflation rate is around 70%).  Collection rates between 
1985 and 1998 ranged from 32% to 50% while the penalty for farmers who do not pay on time is 
only 10% per year.  On the other hand, user organizations, the IAs, have been more successful with 
fee collection.  After transfers, the rates for a sample of IAs averaged about 85.6% between 1994 and 
1998 (Cakmak, 2002; Yazar 2002). 
Problems faced by Water User Associations in irrigation management  
Financial inadequacy is experienced by water user associations when it comes to “lumpy” services 
such as equipment maintenance, or to purchase the equipment themselves.  This situation arises 
when they lack a legal basis (as with the IAs in Turkey) and policy for joint purchases or cost sharing 
for rehabilitation.   
An important issue is the opacity of management of cooperatives.  In the Red River Delta in 
Vietnam, farmer cooperatives balance their budgets but provide no details to farmers to justify the 
costs (Fontenelle and Molle, 2002).  Farmers are, therefore, reluctant to pay for irrigation and 
drainage costs.  Despite a fee collection rate of 92% by the cooperatives, the Irrigation and Drainage 
Management Companies, which depend on the cooperatives for their income, show cumulated 
deficits and unbalanced budgets.  Fontenelle and Molle’s study suggests that financial losses result 
from a lack of transparency and detailed accounting.   Issues of accountability are also observed by 
Yazar (2002) in the Lower Seyhan Irrigation Project in Turkey.  The new role of the state irrigation 
agency, DSI, is unclear and there is danger that the monitoring, regulation, policy and finance, and 
the support services that are expected from it may be abandoned.   
Facon (2002) focuses on the link between irrigation infrastructure and management practices.  It is 
important for WUAs to improve water delivery through system operation strategies that are 
consistent with the flexibility that farmers need.  In addition to infrastructure and distribution rules, 
managerial skills have to be upgraded.  Functions involve a lot of record keeping, responding to 
delivery requests, monitoring water availability and allocation, financial assets, and equipment and 
maintenance programs.  The ability to use tools for modern information and management systems 
will also called upon.  The “bir Ben Kemla” water user association in Tunisia’s Sahel (Lebdi, 
Hamdane and Lamaddalena, 2002) has successfully applied water storage techniques to allow 
discharge-based rotational delivery to manage water by volume. 
Quassem (2002) surmizes that sustainability of water institutions needs a guarantee of funds for 
operation and management activities and training and skills for stakeholders as well as incentives for 
staff of the government agencies, whose support is essential. 
Unver and Gupta, (2002) point to the poor representation by farmers and water users in the 
irrigation associations in Turkey, specifically, the presence of village and municipal heads, elected to 
serve purposes other than the interests of farmers.  In practice, the irrigation associations function 
like agencies of the government that can legally recover their costs from users and are not based on 
participatory management.  Further, there is no incentive to make long-term investments because 
they lack a legal claim to assets they generate.   
Resistance to decentralization in the irrigation sector comes largely from staff attrition in irrigation 
departments and agencies.  Yazar (2002) notes that one reason for government expenditures, in 
Turkey’s Lower Seyhan Irrigation Project, still remaining high is because staff levels have not 
declined fast enough.  Vermillion (1997) however, cites among others, studies in Philippines 
(Oorthuizen and Kloezen, 1995) and Mexico (Johnson, 1996) reporting a reduction in agency staff 
due to transfer programs.     27
Issues in public infrastructure services 
The broad functions of decentralization in infrastructure sectors, such as electricity are planning and 
program design, financing, coordination of various institutions, providing technical assistance, tariff 
and other regulation, selection of appropriate technology, allocation of benefits, project operation, 
management, and maintenance, cost recovery and evaluation of performance. 
The case of rural electrification in Chile illustrates how successful decentralization may be 
implemented in an infrastructure sector (Jadresic, 2000).  Policymakers recognize that involvement by 
the private sector is essential in rural electrification.  However, low consumption and high costs of 
distribution to users scattered in remote locations combine to make the service unattractive to private 
providers.  Thus, the strategy aims to find efficient solutions by incorporating government at all 
levels into a scheme to generate market incentives for private investors or to find alternative 
technologies for very isolated communities.  Thus the main objectives are to promote private 
investment, encourage competition taking into account the structural reforms in the industry, and to 
fit the selected method into the decentralization program of the national government.   
The success of this program lies in the way in which it attempts to overcome the problems that afflict 
decentralization in general.  The strategy is (1) to take local preferences and conditions into account; 
(2) to ensure financial adequacy through joint financing; (3) to lay down clear rules that encourage 
transparency in selection of projects and so that the roles at various levels are apparent enough to 
inform consumers about who is accountable for what; (4) to make certain of local involvement with 
a focus on sustainability; and (5) to be flexible to accommodate alternative low cost solutions in the 
future.   
  The central government, through the National Energy Commission (CNE) plans and defines 
the policy, partially finances, provides technical assistance, and coordinates the institutions involved 
in the program.  The CNE also sets the criteria for evaluation and establishes the rules for deciding 
among competing projects to ensure transparency.  The regional governments identify electricity 
needs, choose solutions, and participate in decisions on the allocation of investment funds.  Upon 
the request of the community and the municipality, the distribution-company or private consulting 
company prepares a project proposal.  A regional agency evaluates the proposal based on criteria 
including the cost-benefit ratio, proportion of the investment to be made by the distribution-
company, and social return.  The head of the regional government presents the selected proposals for 
funding by the regional council.   
  Financing is done on a joint basis, with users being responsible for tariffs and the in-house 
costs of wiring, metering, and grid connection.  Capital investment and management costs are 
covered through contribution by the distribution company and government subsidies.  Both central 
and regional governments contribute to the program through a special fund and allocation depends 
on progress in the previous year and the number of households without access to electricity.   
  The program is flexible enough to respond to technological advances if they prove to be 
economically efficient.  Alternative self-generation technologies, such as photovoltaics and small 
hydroelectric power stations are also considered for remote communities in the hope that future 
demand increase may make it worthwhile to switch to linking to t h e  m a i n  g r i d .   A s  a  r e s u l t ,  
distribution companies have an incentive in staking out their territory in advance, since they do not 
already hold exclusive rights.   
The program has been successful both in terms of coverage and increasing private investment.   
Coverage increased from about 50% to over 75% of rural households between 1992 and 1999.  The 
state’s contribution has been steadily declining while private investment continues to grow.  Aware 
that they are accountable, regional governments see the success of the program as politically 
sensitive.      28
5. EQUITY, CAPTURE BY LOCAL ELITE, AND LESSONS FOR 
INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY 
Unlike infrastructure delivery programs, where the beneficiary pays for service delivery in one form 
or other, the poor in antipoverty programs are too poor to pay in any form. The experience with 
respect to devolution of responsibility to local administrators, to identify socially disadvantaged 
groups informs us about the nature of allocation decisions taken at the local level.  This literature is 
important because proponents of decentralization assume smoothly functioning democratic systems 
and the existence of necessary institutions at local levels, which is not the case in developing 
countries.  Equity issues in several case studies, for example, Koppel (1987) on the Bicol River Basin, 
Philippines and Ioris (2001) on the sub-middle section of the São Francisco River Basin, Brazil 
suggest the relevance of questions about corruption at the local level to successful decentralization in 
integrated river basin management. 
Concern has been expressed in the decentralization literature that the expected gain in efficiency 
from better local information, may be compromised due to more corruption at the local level relative 
to the national level. When the authority to target communities for public services and for targeted 
programs is devolved to local governments then it is particularly important that the local government 
is not captured by local elite.  If captured, services may or may not reach the targeted beneficiaries.  
Besides, there is less accountability due to a breakdown in the democratic process.  (Mathew and 
Nayak, 1996). 
Evidence in the literature on local capture is mixed.  Galasso and Ravallion (2000), in a food-for-
education program in Bangladesh, find that communities with larger land inequalities did not fare 
well in reaching the poor.    However, those villages that had cooperatives for farmers and the 
landless were better in identifying the poor.  These results seem to suggest some evidence for capture 
but the presence of local institutions influenced targeting performance in a positive way.  They also 
note that the program improved in terms of becoming more pro-poor as it advanced.  Alderman 
(1998) finds that the social assistance program in Albania appears to be relying on local information 
and is relatively well targeted to the poor compared to similar programs in other low income 
countries.  The study does not find any indication of usurping of benefits by local elite.         
Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999) make the point that institutional structure for local accountability is 
not already in place in developing countries and unless the local power structures are changed by 
some means, infrastructure delivery can be diverted to local elite who capture the government.  In 
this respect, the central government has an important role in setting up structures that encourage 
participation by the disadvantaged in policy discussion and decision-making and also in choosing 
methods for fiscal decentralization that limit the scope for capture by local elite.   
The authors demonstrate, through their analytical model based on voting behavior, that susceptibility 
to capture by vested interests need not necessarily be greater at the local rather than at the national 
level.  Where the likelihood of capture is greater depends on the specific context, which in turn can 
be analyzed using voting patterns and other data inputs.  This suggests that expected efficiency gains 
from decentralization need not necessarily be negated by a lack of accountability due to manipulation 
by local elites.  The extent of capture depends on how factors, such as, voter awareness (inversely 
proportional to inequality), predictability of the election outcome, and electoral competition, play out 
at the local and national levels.   Fisman and Gatti (2000) contradict these findings with evidence 
suggesting that larger federal transfers are associated with higher rates of conviction for abuse of 
public office in the United States.    
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2001) study how the volume of infrastructure service delivery, including 
roads, water, electricity and telecommunications, is affected and whether local elite (rather than 
others) are more likely to be the beneficiaries of decentralization under different financing 
mechanisms.  They find an overall increase in the volume of service delivery when local governments 
enjoy more fiscal autonomy.  But local elite enjoy a disproportionate share of the benefits relative to 
others.  The extent to which this inequitable distribution occurs depends on how much power is   29
devolved to the local government to raise funds locally and to what degree this power is captured by 
local elite.   
The financing mechanisms examined are local taxes, user fees, and central grants.  When fiscal 
autonomy is greatest, as it is if local governments can levy and bear the cost of collecting taxes, the 
extent of local capture will determine whether decentralization has succeeded in improving service 
delivery compared to central control.  The extent of capture is however less relevant when user fees 
are collected because payment is contingent upon service delivery and the user is free to be the judge 
of that.  For this reason decentralization based on charging user fees, wherever feasible, combines the 
advantages of flexibility in responding to local needs with greater devolved authority and can be 
more efficient than centralized bureaucracies.  (This does not however rule out overprovision to elite 
altogether as that would depend on factors such as the location of the services.)  
A key result of the analysis is that if revenue decentralization is not devolved to local governments 
along with authority over expenditure choices then the volume of service delivery is adjusted 
downward whether the local government is accountable (that is capture) or not.  Financing through 
central grants does not devolve fiscal authority to local governments and is therefore less efficient 
compared to charging user fees.  With central grants, if the funds are insufficient to provide service 
to everyone then either provision favors elites depending on extent of capture by them or with a 
severe financing constraint both elites and others suffer from a lack of infrastructure services.   
Central grants may be qualified as unrestricted, tied to expenditures, or matched to particular 
services.  Again, their success with respect to service delivery will depend on how much flexibility 
they allow to respond to local needs and if at the same time they cannot be easily allocated elsewhere.  
In practice, a combination of financing mechanisms is used (Dillinger, 1995). 
6. DECENTRALIZATION DESIGN: SELECT ISSUES FOR 
INTEGRATED RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT 
The promise of decentralization in the context of river basin management is an exciting one and 
could contribute significantly to improved efficiency in water use, greater equity in allocation of 
water, and the preservation of delicate ecosystems.  However, in practice, effective decentralization is 
not easy.   
This section identifies criteria to gauge success of decentralization based on case studies of river 
basin management in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia.    These case studies have been 
chosen because recent analyses provide reasonably detailed accounts of river basin management and 
decentralization in a wide variety of developing country contexts.  Highlights of the case studies and 
their sources are presented in table 2.  The observed success criteria are then discussed in 
conjunction with the lessons gathered in the review of other sectors.   
Experience with decentralization in river basins 
A useful starting point, for the discussion on river basins, is the summary assessment by Walmsley 
and Hasnip (1997a) of the reasons for success achieved by the Murray-Darling Basin Commission in 
Australia.  These authors recognize that the technical skills, funding, and governance available in the 
context of the Murray-Darling Basin may not be feasible for most developing countries.  Yet, they 
argue that the lessons learned from that experience could provide relevant pointers and benchmarks.  
The authors apply their criteria for success to developing country river basins in China, Ethiopia, 
India, and Zimbabwe and find them useful as a framework for evaluation (Walmsley and Hasnip   30
1997b).  The case studies below confirm the importance of the considerations that Walmsley and 
Hasnip (1997a) lay out6: 
Political will to ensure a “workable and agreeable framework” turns out to be critical because 
important decisions are continually needed to make progress while maintaining the trust of 
stakeholders. 
Administrative and financial autonomy for an “apex” organization that integrates basin-wide activities. 
An open information policy to establish inter-disciplinary communication and hence improve assessment 
methods and decision support tools. 
A strong and enforceable legal base, for example, to allocate property rights, place limitations on ground 
water extraction, and establish a water pricing and cost recovery policy. 
Community awareness, community inputs for formulation of strategy and plans, and community-led 
programs to achieve appropriate and sustainable outcomes. 
To guide the discussion in the rest of this section, the criteria outlined above have been adapted in 
table 2, which presents a simple framework and also a summary description of the case study 
examples.  The choice of criteria in this paper is guided by the focus on the goal of achieving 
accountability and in particular, the historical and political factors that are conducive to the 
realization of that goal.  The columns in this table list the key factors that influence successful 
decentralization.  The set of initial conditions shapes the seriousness with which decentralization 
objectives can be pursued; the political leadership displayed in implementing decentralization is key to 
building the necessary trust and ensuring that difficult decisions are legitimized; and the technical 
arrangements that generate accountability include effective subsidiarity, transparency of objectives and 
responsibilities, and the allocation of property rights.   
First, it appears that among initial conditions the physical characteristics of the area, such as the 
extent of aridity, are not necessarily consequential. This may be so either because greater political 
commitment is generated in areas that are economically important and or because they have strong 
institutions.  Political commitment is critical to establishing effective property rights, which is central 
to playing the coordinating function when centralized structures give way to decentralized decision-
making. 
Second, implementing the principle of subsidiarity is essential if decentralization is to achieve 
successful management outcomes.  The case studies highlight the fact that governments have moved 
towards decentralized functioning and they have also initiated the creation of necessary institutions; 
but, so far, the principle of subsidiarity has remained mainly an objective.  In the progressive cases, 
such as those in Latin America and South Africa, there is a greater commitment to translating the 
principle into practice.  But in other cases, such as, in the Philippines, Nigeria, and China, the 
evidence suggests that administrative devolution and subsidiarity are not working.  The details of the 
case studies suggest several factors such as clear definition of roles and rules, capacity and access to 
information, and, most importantly, effective mechanisms for conflict resolution are vital for 
subsidiarity to flourish. 
Third, integrated river basin management faces significant hurdles when there is no transparency, 
especially in terms of correspondence between stated goals and actual programs.  For example, in the 
Bicol case study, although the stated goal is area development by integrating multiple objectives, in 
reality the focus is only on increased rice cultivation.  In addition, although beneficiary participation 
is a key element of the strategy, there is little evidence of involving all stakeholders. Transparency and 
efficient communication of information become especially important in the context of 
decentralization.  They are essential to the effective participation of stakeholders. 




6 For a similar discussion, see also Visscher, Bury, Gould, and Moriarty (1999).  These authors study integrated 
water resources management principles in the context of drinking water supply and sanitation projects.   31
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Latin American case studies 
Management of the Lerma-Chapala River Basin in Guanajuato State, Mexico.  The Lerma-Chapala River 
Basin is frequently cited in current literature as a promising example of decentralized management 
(Kemper and Olson, 2000; Merrey, 2000; Mestre, 1997; Reynoso, 2000).  Based on all accounts, the 
transition from a decidedly centralized system to a participatory management structure has been 
rapid and has already initiated several programs focusing on water allocation, water quality 
improvement, wastewater treatment, efficient water use, and monitoring the level and quality of 
water in Lake Chapala to name a few.   
The Lerma-Chapala basin is shared by five states.  The basin covers about 77 percent of the state of 
Guanajuato located in central Mexico.  It is this area that is highlighted in this case summary.  About 
85 percent of the water is used for agriculture, 12 percent as potable water, 12 percent for industry, 
and 3 percent for trade and services. 
Three features of this area are of particular significance.  They are: (1) Guanajuato state ranks sixth 
out of 31 states in its contribution to the national gross domestic product; (2) the hydraulic-
geography of Mexico is such that the economically advanced areas of the country, among which 
Guanajuato state is one, are in the semi-arid to arid zone; (3) groundwater is extracted at a rate that is 
greater than the rate of recharge resulting in serious over exploitation.  Merrey (2000) estimates that 
109 percent of available water is developed and used making it a “closed” basin because water 
depletion exceeds water supply.  Increasing levels of pollution due to population growth and 
industrial expansion have exacerbated the situation.    
Taking advantage of the “new Federalism” policy of the government, the National Water 
Commission (CNA) adopted a policy of decentralization to the state level in response to the 
insufficient coverage and inadequate finance in the sector. The regional representatives of the CNA, 
who are independent of the center, are responsible for regulation, coordination, and supervision of 
water sector activities.  The Basin Councils advise the CNA’s regional managers of the planning 
strategy.   The National Water Law, which was approved in 1992, allows state governments to 
collaborate directly with river basin councils to finance and implement various programs in their 
water agenda. The state government could also now convey its plan to improve services in the water 
sector to the Basin Councils, through its regulating body, the State Water Commission.  Thus, the   33
key role of the River Basin Council is one of coordination and planning based on the information it 
receives through this feedback mechanism. 
Within this new legal framework, the state of Guanajuato initiated its own strategy of promoting 
conditions for an integrated approach to sustainable development, with coordination among 
authorities and stakeholders.  The State Commission for Water and Sanitation in Guanajuato 
(CEASG) was appointed to implement its policy and a State Council represents the water users in the 
state who participate in decision making through the Water Technical Boards (COTAS).   
Transparency, accountability, and trust fostered through visible commitment by the authorities are 
key factors for their strengthening and long term viability.  The five-year financial trust set up by the 
state to support these organizations reflects a genuine interest in their survival.  Users are also 
expected to involve themselves in some measuring and operating tasks.  The media has been used 
extensively in Guanajuato to make the public aware of its program.    
  To sum up, in the new management structure, the federal government maintains its authority 
over Mexican water policy and performs its regulation and standardization functions but depends on 
the basin councils to coordinate and resolve conflict among all stakeholders, including 
representatives from all the states sharing the basin, and users.  The state regulating body focuses on 
planning, capacity building, setting up financial mechanisms, efficient water management, and 
organizes user participation.  In this manner, the state maintains a subsidiarity relationship with the 
center and users are expected to engage in a similar subsidiarity relationship with the state.  The basin 
council in its turn is a feedback mechanism between the state, users and the CNA.   
The factors that have enabled a successful transition to the new framework are: the initial conditions 
of water scarcity and the urgent need for a solution; the significant economic contribution of the area 
to the nation; and the acknowledgement of the inability of the CNA to improve conditions on its 
own; the presence of timely leadership at the center, articulated through legislation; the initiative 
taken by the state government to advance its own agenda in keeping with the new framework; the 
commitment to encourage user participation; and the clear mechanisms set in place to obtain 
feedback from all stakeholders. 
Some potential weaknesses of the system pertain to accountability mechanisms to users, and the 
possibility of rent-seeking, favoritism, and nepotism that could threaten the existence of the irrigation 
associations (Kloezen, 1999, as cited in Merrey, 2000).  Also, it is doubtful if all the voiceless poor are 
also included in the dialogue.  Others while acknowledging success in reducing water allocated to 
irrigation, point out that the level of Lake Chapala is still continuing to reduce (Wester, Melville and 
Osorio, 2000, as cited in Merrey, (2000). 
Integrated River Basin Management in Brazil.  In 1989, the Brazilian Water Resources Association 
recognized “the watershed as the territorial unit for management purposes,” in the Declaration of 
Foz do Iguacu.  Following this, in 1991, the state of São Paulo issued the State Law on Water 
Resources Management System, in which it launched, for the first time in Brazil, a bulk water 
charging system, and decentralized water management through River Basin Committees, Porto 
(1998).  Ceara state also adopted the river basin approach in 1992.  Several other states including 
Bahia and Pernambuco continued the pattern in 1996 and 1997 respectively.  Finally, the Federal 
government legitimized the process of decentralization through the National Water Resources 
Management Act, the final version of which was signed in 1997.   It is noteworthy that several 
interested stakeholders were consulted over many years to reach a consensus for the final text of the 
Act, Porto (1998).   
The National Water Policy, defined by the Act is based on the Dublin Statement (1992).  It adheres 
to the principles that water is a public good and a finite resource with an economic value and must be 
managed for multiple purposes, through a participatory approach involving government, users and 
citizens.  It expressly recognizes the watershed as the territorial unit for management. 
The new management system relies on an institutional structure involving River Basin Committees 
and their executing arms, the Water Agencies, at the basin level, and other agencies at the federal, 
state, and municipal levels with a specific assignment of functions to each institution according to 
their respective capacities.   34
  Following are three case studies of river basin management in Brazil, two of which are 
relatively successful in reorganizing the sector and grappling with inefficient water use and one case 
that has failed to make much headway despite being governed by the same new law as described 
above.  The cases are the river basins in Ceara state, the Piracicaba river watershed in São Paulo state, 
and the portion of the São Francisco river basin that lies in the states of Bahia and Pernambuco. 
The Curu, Jaguaribe, and Metropolitana Basins in Ceara State, Brazil.  Ceara state, like Guanajuato in 
Mexico, is another example that has reformed its water sector.  Three river basin committees manage 
its river basins under the state’s own reformed water management system and the umbrella of the 
country’s new water law.   For a detailed case study, see Kemper and Olson (2000) on which this 
summary is based.      
  The Ceara is situated in the semi-arid Northeast of Brazil.  Its area is roughly 148,817 square 
kilometers and the population is about 7 million.  The area has very little groundwater and receives 
an annual precipitation of 600 to 800 millimeters interspersed by droughts.  Due to the irregularity in 
rainfall, the predominant method of securing adequate water supply has been through the 
construction of several thousand reservoirs where surface water is stored and delivered.  About 45 
percent of total water is used for irrigation.   
  Water policy reforms in Ceara began with the preparation of the state water resources plan 
by the Secretariat of Water Resources, in 1986.  Based on this, the state water law was passed in 1992, 
which established the legal background to management at the river basin level.  The World Bank 
played an active role in guiding the reforms whose objectives included charging tariffs for all users, 
establishing water user associations, testing the concept of a water market, and the founding of a new 
water resources management company, Companhia de Gestao dos Recursos Hidricos (COGERH). 
Since 1994, COGERH has set up three river basin committees, namely, the Jaguaribe, the Curu and 
the Metropolitana basins.  Among other positive outcomes are the launching of several water user 
committees at the river basin level, the introduction of bulk water pricing structures for industries, 
irrigation and for the state sanitation company, and instituting professionally managed supply 
systems.   The process of decentralization was enabled by about 400 sponsored events that brought 
together participants from irrigation and industry.   The introduction of a water market, however, 
proved to be too ambitious, given that the existing law does not allow it.   
The present conditions have evolved gradually by combining the different motivating factors of 
various state agencies.  For example, COGERH took three years to gain control of the reservoirs, 
whose management it now shares with another agency.  Finding the Curu and Jaguaribe basins 
unable to pay tariffs that could cover operation and maintenance costs, COGERH sought to reduce 
water usage through collective decision making in water user committees.  So far, it has succeeded in 
doing so in the Curu basin.     
The Piracicaba River Basin.  Porto, (1998) provides an example located in São Paolo state.  Here, the 
Piracacaba River Basin Committee manages three river basins.  This is a highly developed area with 
conflicting demands for water from industry, households, agriculture, and consumers in the 
Metropolitan Region of São Paulo.  Although the mean precipitation is 1400 millimeters, water 
shortage is still felt.  The problem of sewage treatment is also in need of immediate attention.   
  The seeds of collective decision-making were sown when the mayors of all the municipalities 
in the basin resolved to improve water quality.  In 1991, the State Water Resources Management 
System invested the River Basin Committee with the authority to prioritize the steps to be taken.  
The 48-member group represented equally by the state government, stakeholders, and municipalities 
determined to upgrade both water quality and quantity aspects, with public participation; charge for 
bulk water; sort through conflicts and agree on how state and other funds were to support the 
process.  
  Except for charging for bulk water, all other objectives are proceeding with satisfactory 
progress.  By 1997, four wastewater treatment facilities were restored.   US$10million is earmarked 
for more projects, including a new water resources information system.  
The Sub-Middle Section of the São Francisco River basin.  The São Francisco River flows in the interior of 
Northeast Brazil.  The sub-middle section of this river covers approximately 390,000 square   35
kilometers in the Bahia and Pernambuco states.  It has a tropical semi-arid, variable climate that may 
change from a few months of intense precipitation to long dry spells.  The mean annual precipitation 
is 350-600 millimeters and droughts occur from time to time.  About three-fourths of the water is 
consumed for irrigation, which, apart from production, is viewed as a means to control drought.  
Hydropower generation is the other major user.  
Three notable features of this area are: (1) it is strategically situated because it provides hydropower 
to downstream cities; (2) it is a federal river because it crosses interstate boundaries; and (3) it is 
controlled by large landowners who influence the local economy including federal actions taken with 
respect to water allocation and control.  
The Company for the Development of the São Francisco Valley (CODEVASF) is in charge of 
managing the water resources in the basin.  While some effort has been made to encourage efficiency 
in rural areas, so far the main accomplishment has been to construct large irrigation projects with the 
help of federal investments described as “inefficient” (Simpson, 1999, as cited in Ioris, 2001) and has 
focused on emergency measures rather than taking steps towards risk management.   Further, while 
the public sector is responsible for many of the investments, little has been done to maintain 
navigable waters and resolve the mismatch between power generation and oil driven irrigation 
schemes (Romano and Cadavid Garcia, 1999). 
Ioris (2001) describes how a lack of continuity in implementing plans and the inability of federal, 
state, and municipal agencies to coordinate under a system of centralized decision making outside the 
basin, have contributed to disappointing results, despite the new integrated approach being fostered 
by the center.  Among these results is the failure so far to deal effectively with the widespread 
environmental degradation, in particular, the highly polluted water contaminated by mines and 
industries in the upper reaches.       
But one of the key reasons for failure to implement reform is the uneven social structure, with wealth 
concentrated in the hands of the landed few while the majority of the landless population lives on 
rain-fed agriculture.  This section of the population, with no formal property rights survives on 
subsistence farming, carried out with the help of government subsidies in public irrigation districts.  
Consequently, expansion of public irrigation is slow and proves inadequate as a means to support the 
farmers in times of drought.  The reason for this inaction is linked directly to the fact that water 
scarcity chiefly affects the deprived groups while those capable of coping with droughts are unwilling 
to break with the traditional ways of storing water in order to maintain their control (Livingstone and 
Assuncao, 1993; as cited in Ioris, 2001). 
  The other key reason for unsatisfactory management is the failure to settle conflicts in water 
allocation. There are several sources of dispute.  Water is diverted for irrigation purposes upstream, 
while sufficient flow is required to operate the hydropower plants downstream.    Similarly, flood 
control implies reduced flow at certain times, which clashes with the interests of hydroelectricity 
production and navigation, both of which need larger volumes of water.  Other sore points include 
the privatization of the federal hydroelectricity utility and the proposal to transfer water to basins in 
the north of the river without open discussion.   With respect to the latter, there is evidence of a lack 
of transparency and accountability especially since the negative impacts of the proposal have not 
been properly assessed.  It is unclear if the displaced persons would receive any compensation, and 
there has been no justification for the enormous expense.  
Comparison of the various cases presented in Brazil.  Looking at the success stories and the last less 
progressive case, we may observe some important factors that led to the differing outcomes.   All 
three cases are similar in one respect: in all cases improper management practices led to the decline in 
water services and to serious environmental degradation.  
Ceara state showed political leadership by instituting their own reformed water law and by setting up 
a water management company to implement it.  Taking note of the watershed as the territorial unit 
for water management, the mayors in the Piracicaba river basin embarked on a strategy of collective 
action, which later evolved into the constructive proposals adopted by the São Paolo state.   In the 
São Francisco River Basin, however, most intervention still appears to be made by the federal 
government.  Kemper and Olson (2000) note that, “under Brazilian law a state has full jurisdiction   36
over a river that flows entirely within its own boundaries; otherwise the river is subject to federal 
legislation.”  Perhaps the fact that the São Francisco is a federally controlled river explains the lack of 
initiative at the local level.   In fact, Ioris (2001) informs us that there is yet no central committee 
overseeing the whole basin. 
From another angle, it is tempting to conclude that a relatively well-developed economy is conducive 
to implementing rapid reform.  The idea that water is an economic good and its provision has to be 
paid for is likely to be easier to implement under these conditions.  Certainly, the relatively developed 
initial conditions in the Lerma-Chapala basin in Guanajuato, Mexico and Piracicaba basin in Brazil 
may be presented as evidence.   
In contrast, where the majority of the population scrapes together a living based on small scale 
farming, translating this idea into practice would be much more difficult, as is the case in the São 
Francisco sub-middle basin.  This basin sub-division and those in Ceara are drought prone, struggle 
with a variable climate, and an uneven social structure.   However, what explains the gains made in 
Ceara?  It may be argued that the decentralization of decision making to the state level and the fact 
that the new government, in the state, was more industry and business oriented served to break from 
the traditional focus on large-scale irrigation alone.  But in the São Francisco sub-basin, federal 
government intervention, the relative independence of the landowners, bureaucrats and engineering 
companies due in part to their influence with the federal agencies and the formal property rights of 
landowners, appear to have combined to thwart any progressive reform.  Another observation that 
bolsters this view is that large amounts of financial resources have been budgeted for projects 
relating to river management, yet they are not seen to be helping to fulfill the stated objectives.  For 
example, US$ 750 million over 10 years has been allocated for various measures to cope with 
environmental degradation and the estimated cost of transferring water to basins further north is 
US$1.5 billion (Ioris, 2001).    
This brings the discussion to the issue of transparency, both in planning and financial expenditure, to 
foster trust in the government’s actions.  In the São Francisco case, the uncertainties and lack of 
answers to questions raised about the proposal to transfer water further north calls for a greater 
degree of transparency.  This is also suggested by the fact that there is controversy surrounding what 
positive impacts the proposal would have for local stakeholders and that there is little public 
participation in preparing for negative fallout.  Also, the discontinuity in implementation when 
governments change has resulted in a loss of confidence in the minds of the public who doubt the 
objectives articulated by the federal government are going to be fulfilled in their area.           
  Participation by various stakeholders is consciously incorporated into the implementation 
program in the river basins in Ceara and the Piracicaba basin.  The result is that COGERH, in Ceara, 
was able to negotiate with stakeholders having conflicting incentives and arrive at a working 
arrangement for the present.  The Piracicaba River Basin Committee is equally represented by state 
government, municipalities, and stakeholders.  It is yet to be seen how this group will handle the 
question of bulk water pricing which is on their agenda. 
  Again, with the skewed social structure referred to earlier it is unclear if the existing models 
of decentralization being attempted in Latin America can be successful without first dealing with 
wider issues, such as land reform.  One question that arises is what common incentive could cement 
water user associations in the case of landless laborers to ensure that their voice is heard? 
African case studies
7 
The Olifants River Basin, South Africa.  This case study centers on the part of the Olifants River Basin 
that is accessible to South Africa for development and use.  The basin, which is about the size of the 




7 Rangeley, Thiam, Andersen, and Lyle (1994) discuss several African case studies but they deal principally with 
sharing of international river waters and the discussion is by now likely to be outdated.   37
Lerma-Chapala in Mexico, faces severe water scarcity.  The shortage of water arises for two main 
reasons: (1) most of the flow from tributaries into the river occurs below this section, after which the 
river crosses into Mozambique; (2) water is diverted to thermal power plants in the upper stretch of 
the river.  Pollution from the mines further intensifies the paucity of clean water. 
The government in the Republic of South Africa has laid out the water policy framework in its 
National Water Act (No.36 of 1998) and the Water Services Act (No.108 of 1997).  The policy sets 
forth the following: “equity in access to water resources, benefits and services; sustainability; optimal 
beneficial use; redress of past racial and gender discrimination; participation by stakeholders in 
decision-making about water resources; ‘representivity’ to ensure consideration of all stakeholder 
needs, interests and values; ‘subsidiarity’ i.e., devolution of responsibility to the lowest appropriate 
level; integration of water resource management functions; alignment of water resources 
management with other related departments’ functions, and transparency to foster cooperation and 
encourage stakeholder support for decisions” (Merrey, 2000). 
  The policy statement is a clear commitment from the government based on the Dublin 
Statement, 1992.  Further, the unit for integrated water resources management is stipulated to be the 
‘catchment’ as the river basin is called in South Africa.   
According to the new administrative structure, the government, through the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) is in charge of the nation’s water resources based on the National 
Water Act.  It continues to grant licenses for water uses, ensures minimum flows in rivers, and 
represents the national interest with respect to international sharing of river water.  
  Other management functions at the basin level will be carried out by “Catchment 
Management Agencies” (CMAs).  Further devolution of responsibility will occur by organizing 
“water user associations” to provide local water services.  To implement this, the government 
proposes to transfer the management of already existing small-scale irrigation schemes to the users.  
  Apart from the DWAF and the proposed CMA, the stakeholders in this context are the 
commercial farmers, water supply companies, the mining and industrial sectors, thermal power 
plants, and the unorganized sector including the small-scale irrigation sector.  All sectors except the 
last are well organized to voice their interests.  The government strategy is to ensure water security to 
high-value uses, but at the same time remedy the injustices of the past apartheid regime.   
The process of implementing the guidelines of the National Water Act is at the stage of preparing the 
proposal outlining the CMA’s mandate and in bringing together water user associations.  It is 
therefore too early to look for successful outcomes.  However, progressive outcomes so far are: it 
has been recognized that water scarcity can worsen without immediate appropriate action; a choice of 
reforming the water policy to one based on decentralized management has been made and it is yet to 
be seen what kinds of difficulties will be faced in implementation. 
Cross River Basin, Nigeria.  In the early 1960s, Nigeria was set on a course towards rural development 
through better land use.  By the early 1970s, the experiment resulted in a few successes and a string 
of failures.   At the same time, the worsening water supply situation and fear of a food crisis, led the 
government to pursue a different approach.  The linkages between management at the river basin 
level and social and economic development, with water as the integrating element were seen to 
present an alternative means to achieve their objectives.  In 1977, the government launched eleven 
river basin development authorities whose mandate was to “achieve fullest possible use of all 
resources in the basin” (Salau, 1990).  The approach aimed at integrating the interests of irrigation, 
navigation, hydroelectric power, reclamation of flood-prone areas, soil conservation, recreation, and 
afforestation.   
  The Cross River Basin Committee was created within the above framework.  This case is 
included in the sample of river basin management experiences because it is an attempt at 
decentralization, and it is a valuable case study for lessons in the context of Africa.  The extent of 
decentralization and the nature of integration are not as comprehensive as articulated in the South 
African case, but may be viewed as an attempt in that direction, under its own unique social and 
political conditions.     38
Cross River and its tributaries are located in the south of the country where in spite of plenty of 
water-most of it surface water, and huge expenditure, water provision, especially for agriculture, is 
still a constraint.   
  Udofia (1988) doubts if the objectives stated in the river basin decree will ever be 
accomplished under the present conditions.  In fact, the author points out that the document was not 
carefully thought through because some of the objectives are irrelevant to the Cross basin.   For 
example, there are no lakes or lagoons in the State, so development of fisheries did not apply, nor is 
any part of the basin so badly submerged as to need reclamation.  Similarly, some of the projects 
were poorly conceived.  The impact of fish farming will have greater impact in fish deficient areas 
rather than in places where they are plentiful.  The underlying reasons for poor planning are a lack of 
data, financial resources, capacity, and transparency.  In addition, the overlap of jurisdictions of 
different river basin authorities leads to conflict. 
  Emphasis on the need for accurate information on the quality and quantity of water 
resources and about the population of consumers is echoed in other studies in the African context 
(Salau, 1990; Stoffberg, van Zyl and Middleton, 1994).  Scudder (1989) cites the inadequacy of 
project appraisal techniques and scanty environmental and social impact evaluation of large-scale 
river basin projects, to suggest a lack of interest in accountability.   
  Although the Nigerian government set priorities to integrate aspects of water and land 
resources, in reality, understandably, provision of potable water and food security received top 
priority.  Most attention was paid to construction of large dams to the neglect of soil conservation, 
navigation, pollution control, flood damage reduction and even resettlement of displaced people in 
dam projects (Mitchell, 1990). 
  River Basin Development Authorities are made responsible for many functions by decree; 
however, in practice they face resistance in states governed by political parties different from the 
party at the center.  Their inability to coordinate proves to be an obstacle in trying to implement the 
government’s agenda.  Further, Scudder (1989) argues that in the context of dam projects, river basin 
authorities become “executing agencies for the coalition of developers….such other options as rain 
fed agriculture, flood water cultivation, and livestock management tend to be ignored, as is the 
participation of local organizations in the planning, implementation and evaluation of development 
projects and programs.”  It may be debated as to what kind of decentralized structure is the first best 
solution to achieve the government’s stated goals.  
Asian case studies 
Yellow River Basin, China.  “In 17 out of the past 25 summers the Yellow River’s bed has been left dry 
further and further upstream for longer periods of time” (Zusman, 1998).  A World Bank report 
concluded that water scarcity might have year round implications throughout northern China (World 
Bank, 1993b).  Among principal factors contributing to water shortages are excessively sediment-
laden flow, and increasing demand from different sectors, especially from agriculture.  Zusman 
(1998) contends that the way in which the political system works with regard to water is the “factor 
most attributable to the current water problems.”  
The Chinese constitution stipulates that all water in the nation belongs to the Chinese state.  The 
Chinese view of integrated management requires the development and utilization of water and 
disaster prevention to be planned in a comprehensive manner, with all relevant aspects taken into 
account, with full consideration of the multiple uses of water (Solanes, 1998).   
  The Yellow River Conservancy Commission (YRCC) was created in 1933 to coordinate 
conflicts between upstream and downstream users.  Later, when political and economic reforms were 
introduced in the 1970s and 1980s, policymaking authority was devolved from the center to the 
provinces.  A host of bureaucratic agencies from state, provincial and local levels are in charge of 
water resources in the Yellow River basin.  Chief among them are the State Council, the Ministry of 
Water Resources (MWR), the YRCC, and the Ministry of Electric Power (MEP).   
The MWR is in charge of basin level planning and must seek approval of its plans from the State 
Council.  The nine provincial governments are equal in rank to the MWR and could influence   39
decision making in keeping with their interests.   The role of the YRCC is complicated since it is 
lower in rank than the provincial governments but is expected to coordinate the provincial needs in 
the basin with the plans of the MWR. 
Zusman’s (1998) view suggests an unclear definition of functions assigned to each agency.  While 
there is a complicated structure in place, the processes and mechanisms by which the system is to 
operate are vague.  Procedures such as the issue of water permits are informal and decided on a case-
by-case basis.  For example, which users can apply for a permit and which agency approves the 
permit are uncertain. 
Another ambiguous factor is the role of the YRCC.   Although it is responsible for coordination and 
planning in the basin, the agency finds itself limited in the extent of its authority.  The existence of 
other smaller agencies in the upper and lower reaches of the river, which act relatively independently, 
undermines the YRCC’s ability to serve as a unifying force needed to manage the basin as a whole.  
In addition, coordination between the YRCC and the government at the Center is lacking.  To 
illustrate this Zusman (1998) refers to the long-discussed plan to divert water from the Yangtze River 
in southern China to the semi-arid/arid areas of the north, and in particular to Beijing.  The opinion 
of water managers and the YRCC differs from that of the central government, which they contend is 
not based on conditions relating to the basin.   
There is some interagency participation in the sense of bargaining to reach a consensus, but even 
here decision-making may be swayed in a direction favored by a more influential official such as a 
provincial governor. 
In the opinion of Paterson (1986), “a key structural element inhibits integration and inter-agency 
cooperation….  A major barrier is the necessity for operating the public sector as a single unit for 
purposes of public policy, but as a collection of substantially independent units for the purpose of 
management” (Paterson, 1986 as cited in Mitchell, 1990).  One consideration in setting up 
administrative structures is to define the function of each organizational unit as clearly as possible, 
although as Mitchell (1990) reminds us boundary problems will always occur.  Integrated 
management of the Yellow River Basin serves to illustrate this point.    
The Bicol River Basin, Philippines.  The Bicol River is susceptible to tidal flooding and flooding after 
typhoons.  Since the area does not have sufficient basic infrastructure it suffers from isolation when 
faced with natural hazards, especially after torrential rainfall.  As a result, it is one of the poorest 
ranking regions in the Philippines with a per capita income that is 49 percent of the national average.  
Consequently, management of the river and flood control is linked to economic development of this 
predominantly agricultural region.    
The Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP) was decreed in 1976 with the “integration of 
national and local government programs and the decentralization of rural development project 
planning and implementation as the preferred development strategy for the Bicol River Basin” 
(Koppel, 1987). 
The Bicol River Basin Coordinating Committee (BRBCC) was set up for policy making and 
coordinating functions at the program level.  It began by creating task forces and working groups to 
forge links with regional offices of national agencies as well as provincial and municipal governments.  
However, it found its leadership role to be undermined because it was bypassed by the agencies it 
was trying to coordinate.  A large part of the project development, implementation, and maintenance 
functions were carried out by local and national agencies in the region after direct negotiation with 
the center.     
  The development strategy was to target efforts in a single area with high growth potential, to 
create a growth pole for the whole region and to integrate planning across all sectors.  Further, 
project planning and management was to be decentralized to maximize participation from all sectors 
in an area’s development.   
In reality the impacts were largely felt in only one province out of the six provinces in the region.  
The focus was almost entirely on rice production, which was expected to stimulate the rest of the 
economy.  Out of 26,751 hectares targeted by the Program 10,600 hectares were irrigated, by 1985.  
Irrigated area harvested increased by 29 percent between 1981 and 1984; total production in all   40
irrigated areas increased by 36.8 percent, and yields in irrigated areas increased by 6 percent per 
hectare.  At the same time, overall production in rain fed areas increased by only 1.1 percent and 
yields increased by 4 percent per hectare.  Population grew by about 7 percent in the same period.   
The gains in rice production, however, did not lead to growth in the local economy, as the 
development strategy was expected to do.  Rice productivity was helped by the newly constructed 
roads which opened up easier access to the markets in Manila, leaving the local warehousing, milling, 
and rice wholesaling businesses without the Program’s benefits.  Income distribution became more 
unequal between 1978 and 1983 in the entire region indicating that the Program did not influence the 
targeted province in any significantly different way.  High rates of unemployment and 
underemployment continued and the region’s per capita gross domestic product continued to remain 
among the lowest in the country. 
Koppel (1987) reasons that although there were some positive outcomes the results may have been 
better if the last element in the strategy was actually followed, namely, decentralizing and maximizing 
participation from all stakeholders, including the beneficiaries themselves.  By giving the local 
government more authority, especially in financial management and project administration, it would 
convey the idea that the local government is responsible for the maintenance of the project after it is 
complete, thus reducing transaction costs.   In similar vein, if in this context, the farmers saw 
themselves as owners of the irrigation systems constructed for them, they would have the incentive 
to maintain them and further sustain the benefits that could accrue from the Program’s investment.  
This could only happen if they were included even in the planning phase. 
  Koppel’s argument essentially questions whether the funding and existence of a separate 
basin level agency, such as the BRBDPO in its current situation, can be justified given the experience 
so far.  It can if it has a clearly defined basin-wide role with a special focus on building a broad base 
among stakeholders and beneficiaries.  Instead it appears to have been like a supplementary 
government department that overlapped with existing mandates.  There is plenty of evidence in 
Koppel’s account to suggest that it was viewed by other agencies as an unnecessary competitor for 
authority, and financial resources.  The underlying factor here is clearly one of a lack of political will 
at the center, which decentralized only in form but not by transferring any degree of authority or 
independence.  In other words, there is no real principle of subsidiarity at work.  This is important 
because decentralization based on subsidiarity, that allows local governments to recognize a body like 
the BRBDP as a basin wide institution with a unique and distinct mandate is the only way to find 
cooperation.    
Neither did the BRBDP apply the principle with respect to the beneficiaries.  For example, despite 
the various committees instituted to foster participation, only a select group, that excluded farmers, 
small business owners and landless laborers, was invited.  Many members of the private sector were 
unaware of the Private Advisory Committee whose job it was to communicate between them and the 
BRBDP.  There is evidence that farmers did try to participate but their role was limited to attending 
meetings where programs were described.  
This example focuses on rural development through managing irrigation water, in the context of a 
river basin.  It differs in some ways from the other examples in South Africa and Latin America 
where the issues are directly related to water allocation, pricing, or environmental degradation.   
However, the lessons learned are highly relevant to the implementation of integrated river basin 
management through a process of decentralization.  As Castro (1995) explains, this process 
“…abruptly modifies a complex net of power relations built around water management.  The 
reconstitution of this net of relations between the central power and the final consumer is a key issue 
within the current process of modernization.”    
7. LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER SECTORS RELEVANT TO 
RIVER BASINS 
This paper identifies the set of initial conditions, the political leadership displayed in implementing 
decentralization, and the factors that minimize transactions costs, such as effective subsidiarity,   41
transparency of objectives and responsibilities, and the allocation of property rights as key factors 
that influence successful decentralization in river basin management.  Increased participation through 
water users associations and other mechanisms is crucial to successful decentralization and, 
potentially, has a high pay off.  However, the prerequisites for effective participation are also 
demanding, especially where traditional structures are not reflected in the overall design of the river 
basin management and where deep social inequities persist. 
From reviewing other sectors we find that the following aspects of initial conditions and history influence 
the efficiency and equity outcomes of decentralization and therefore steps must be taken to 
overcome any potential negative effects.     
(1) First, we learned that gains from lower transactions costs when decisions are based on better local 
information are more likely in a large country setting rather than in a small one.  In large federal 
systems such as in the United States and Brazil, considerable authority is devolved to the individual 
states, however, this seems counterproductive in small countries where regions or districts are not 
likely to have the necessary tax base (insufficient population and economic activity especially in 
agrarian economies) to support public services without dependence on central transfers.   
Decentralization is in fact, desirable in large countries because under central control districts are too 
remote from the center for adequate financial accountability in terms of how transferred funds have 
been spent.  Further, the incentive to utilize local information is greater for decision makers at the 
lower levels than it is at the center.  
In the Gambia, a relatively small country, delivery of health services was managed directly by the 
Ministry of Health and only recently are management teams being established in the regions to 
encourage more local decision-making (Mills et al., 1990).  On the other hand, in larger countries, 
even control at the state level appears centralized to those at the grassroots.  At the same time, 
hospital and other secondary health services require a large enough population base to support 
economically efficient service delivery. Hence, how many intermediate levels are essential to 
supervise, manage and provide effective primary health care services within available financial 
resources is a critical issue in the health sector.   
In Chile, the health system has evolved so that there are four levels of management with distinct 
functions.  State representatives, appointed by the Ministry of Health are positioned in 13 regions 
and 27 area health service centers, which in turn can transfer some management and primary health 
services to municipalities.  Planning and policymaking are the main functions of the Ministry of 
Health.  Directors appointed to regional levels and their offices carry out supervisory and 
administrative functions while the management and implementation of health care activities, 
comprising mainly curative and preventive services, is entrusted to the area health services.  Since 
municipalities also handle other related tasks such as, housing and toilet facilities, unemployment 
benefits and educational facilities, it is considered useful to include primary health care also at that 
level.  Further this brings the reach of health care to a level where there is better information of local 
needs and contribution from municipal funds (Montoya-Aguilar and Vaughan in Mills et al., 1990).  
But recalling the example of the municipality of El Bosque (see section 4.2 on healthcare), even this 
organization leaves less financially endowed municipalities strapped for funds (Gideon, 2001). 
  The issue of sufficient size (in an economic sense) is relevant for river basin management 
because the hierarchy of agencies that are set up may also have to depend on revenues and/or 
compete with other sectors for financial resources.  In Indonesia, the Jatiluhur Authority (POJ) on 
the Citarum River Basin and the Brantas Basin Water Management Corporation (PJT) are 
underfunded to cope with their responsibilities.  Income from urban and industrial water supply 
covers only 50% of their costs while the contribution from irrigation is minimal.  Both corporations 
post budget surpluses around 10% to 15% by cutting down on their activities in order to be viewed 
as healthy agencies.  While other factors such as tariffs set by the government and lack of access to 
outside lending contribute in part to their financing problems, it may be argued that size of the 
revenue base also has a role to play.  The POJ has to compete for provincial and central subsidies 
while the PJT has to manage solely from revenues (Alaerts and Le Moigne, forthcoming).     42
  Other examples of river basin agencies that need a large enough revenue base to carry out 
their activities are:  the Water Agencies in France that levy and collect pollution charges from water 
users in order to finance five-year programs for pollution control and other projects.  The Tarim 
Basin Water Resources Protection Fund in the People’s Republic of China is dependent on “water 
fees and penalty fees, and budget allocations from the central, regional and prefecture governments” 
in addition to a variety of loans and taxes (Alaerts and Le Moigne, forthcoming).   In fact, as we 
learned in the Bicol River Basin (Philippines) case study, there is a danger of an ineffective river basin 
organization being viewed as an unnecessary drain on local financial resources, which could threaten 
its long term existence.  
(2) History plays an important role in shaping the decentralization reform in the water resources 
sector.  In the case of some African nations the impact of policies pursued by former colonial rulers 
has to be addressed if decentralization has to be successful especially with respect to equity issues.  
The problems arise from the former policy of access to water having been tied to land ownership 
where the owners are predominantly white farmers.  One example is the Zimbabwean study by 
Derman et al (2000) already described in section 4.1.  In that context, conversion of former water 
rights to water permits continues to marginalize small farmers and women despite the establishment 
of stakeholder associations.   
Schur (2002) describes South Africa’s new water pricing and access to irrigation water strategy as 
being designed to redress past imbalances that existed under the apartheid regime and at the same 
time to manage the water resources efficiently.  Water service authorities are to receive 25 liters per 
capita per day free of charge to accommodate at least 18 million people without access to basic 
potable water.  Previously disadvantaged farmers will be allowed access to irrigation water from 
Government Schemes through land reform.  Other programs include concessionary periods when 
they will not be charged for the full cost of water whereas established schemes and commercial 
farmers will be subject to full cost recovery of O & M plus catchment costs. 
Similarly, the role of history is evident in river basins.  The hierarchy that manages the Aral Sea Basin 
today had to be reorganized to protect the interests of five independent nations (Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic) all of which were part of the former 
Soviet Union.  In the earlier situation, operation and maintenance of headwater infrastructure was 
handled by two federally funded basin organizations.  Today, the Inter-State Commission for Water 
Coordination approves policy proposals for consideration by the International Fund for Saving the 
Aral Sea, comprising representatives from all five nations (Dukhovny and Sokolov in Alaerts and Le 
Moigne, forthcoming).  
(3) Conditions that encourage cooperation among small groups are widely discussed in the 
decentralization literature (Bardhan, 1993; Wade, 1997; Ostrom, 1990).   Tomosho, Fujimoto, and 
Yoshomura (2002) observe a “social dilemma” in the context of irrigators in the Lake Biwa area in 
Japan.  Irrigation water pricing includes a volumetric component that is measured by a flow meter 
associated with each block of irrigated area which is managed by a farmer group.  Here, in order to 
discourage individual farmers from feeling tempted to use more water than others in the block, 
farmers were kept informed about the differences in the water charges among blocks so as to 
encourage competition among them to reduce charges.  The groups are further divided and kept 
within their living settlements in order to promote cohesiveness among the members of the group.  
This aspect is important in the integrated management of river basins especially if decisions at the 
lowest appropriate level are to be made via stakeholder dialogue and participation.  Cooperation is 
also critical in coordinating upstream and downstream activities.  The idea may even be extended to 
cooperation among riparian nations as is demonstrated by the countries in the Rhine River Basin in 
trying to contain chemical pollution levels through cooperative agreements (Huisman, Pieter in 
Alaerts and Le Moigne, forthcoming).  
(4) Initial conditions also imply existing legislation, especially relating to property and water rights and 
institutions such as effective voting mechanisms at the local level.  The issue of corruption and 
capture by local elite was covered at length in section 4.6 largely in the context of targeted assistance 
programs.  The idea was also touched upon in describing the resistance by teachers’ unions to   43
control of their salaries, appointments, transfers, and promotions by non-professionals in the 
education sector.  One of the key aspects of integrated river basin management is allocation of water 
rights and ensuring access to water for all users.  Therefore, the possibility of capture of benefits by 
some groups must be addressed.  
The issue takes on added significance because of the policy to recover costs, particularly those 
pertaining to operation and maintenance, management and delivery, and even capital investments 
such as irrigation infrastructure wherever possible.  The only way to secure widespread acceptance of 
paying for services relating to water resources management for the benefit of all users is if those 
benefits actually reach all users.  To begin with users have to be made aware of and educated about 
what their role as stakeholders in the water sector implies.  Derman et al. (2000) observe that the vast 
“majority of Zimbabweans (as in most nations) are not politically active in the water arena” and the 
government takes on the role of protecting their interests.  The mode of stakeholder participation 
has to be designed to ensure that the voices of those without significant property rights or permits 
are not lost.   
In this respect, the importance of local institutions is stressed in the literature.  Galasso and Ravallion 
(2000) find better targeting of the poor for assistance where cooperatives for farmers and landless 
laborers exist.  Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2001) study the policy to reserve one-third of all 
candidacies for heads of village councils in India for women.  They conclude, based on a district in 
West Bengal, that drinking water, fuel and roads are paid more attention when women leaders take 
the decisions.  Further, participation by women was also greater when the leader of the council was a 
woman. 
(5) The issue of capture is directly linked to the extent of economic inequality existing before the 
decentralization reform.  The case studies of integrated river basin management in Brazil described 
earlier, illustrate how states differed in the way they took advantage of the National Water Policy and 
the National Water Resources Management Act.  In particular, the uneven social structure in the São 
Francisco River basin (Ioris 2001) has accorded low priority to expand public irrigation on which the 
subsistence farmers depend during periods of drought relative to the storage structures catering to 
large landowners. 
Political leadership and commitment  
Political commitment to decentralization has many dimensions.  It is imperative for the national 
government to clarify its position by decree or though the promulgation of laws.  It is particularly 
useful to signal continuity in policy when governments change in quick succession.  In the health 
sector, for example, decentralization is a slow process and sufficient time is needed for each phase to 
stabilize.  Rapid changes in the national government, as was the case in Yugoslavia between 1946 and 
1974, prevent follow-up measures from being carried out after the initial round of restructuring has 
been instituted, leading to uncertainty and having to retrace some steps already taken in a certain 
direction.  Similarly, it is equally important for state or regional governments in a federal system to 
affirm their compliance or otherwise to indicate what local populations may expect.  Political 
leadership is especially in focus when reforms are triggered by deteriorating conditions as was the 
case in some African nations (e.g., Benin, Zambia; see healthcare sector section 4.2) or in response to 
environmental pollution affecting the local economy as in the Murray-Darling Basin. 
Decentralization and subsidiarity 
While the main message that organization based on the subsidiarity principle is crucial for success is 
clear in all sectors reviewed, the problems with implementation are equally visible.  It is evident from 
the experience of other sectors that strategies must focus on financing mechanisms and upgrading 
skills especially those relating to planning and management.  For example, in a decentralized scenario 
in the road sector, local governments may be more successful with lowering resource costs if they are 
able to forge alliances, requiring persuading and negotiating skills, with neighboring districts in order 
to negotiate large scale contracts with private providers.  Principals and teachers must be competent   44
as educators but also as managers in school-based management, for instance.  Since opportunities to 
train are few at the lower level, special attention has to be paid to training.  The lesson here is that 
gains from devolution may only be expected after adequate capacity is built up and therefore, shifting 
authority at the appropriate time is a critical component in decentralization strategy. 
Implementation based on the subsidiarity principle is also contingent upon transparency.  This implies 
attention to three areas: (1) clear statement of objectives and commitment to them as against other 
unstated goals; (2) definition of roles and responsibilities that make practical sense; and (3) reliance 
on good quality information and data.  Situations where supervisory roles are thrust upon positions 
with no legal authority to discipline those being supervised are common.  In Botswana, the regional 
health teams find themselves supervising services and staff over whom they have no disciplinary 
authority.  The role of the Catchment Manager in the water sector in Zimbabwe is equally ambiguous 
since the manager is accountable to the government ministry whereas the Catchment Councils that 
he/she oversees are accountable to stakeholders.  Similar situations are illustrated in the Bicol case 
study where the entire river basin agency was bypassed by the local government agencies and in the 
Yellow River Basin where the YRCC is lower in rank than the provincial governments yet it has to 
supervise and coordinate their needs with those of the Ministry of Water Resources.    
In the education sector we learned about the debate over whether politicians are competent enough 
to be in charge of policy (which in turn could influence even issues such as choice of curricula and 
text books traditionally left entirely to professionals).  Although on the face of it this question may 
seem irrelevant to river basins, similar situations do appear in this sector also.  For example, consider 
the contradiction in views between the YRCC and the central government with regard to the 
proposal to divert water from the Yangtze River in Southern China up to Beijing and surrounding 
areas.  The question is are politicians at the center competent to take decisions that may affect river 
basins and their delicate ecological systems and how much authority do river basin authorities really 
have relative to central governments?  Would it be sufficient for river basin authorities to merely play 
an advisory role in this context?    
Key implementation strategies:  a summary 
Decentralization is multifaceted.  As a consequence, the feasibility and success of decentralization 
depends on a variety of complementary actions.  Thus, while technical considerations, such as, 
lowering transactions costs through better customer feed-back at the local level and evidence of 
declining scale economies in infrastructure sectors, form a core consideration in the desirability and 
success of decentralization, regulatory, administrative, political, and fiscal mechanisms need to evolve 
to support effective decentralization.  All necessary aspects of decentralization usually have to work 
in tandem to make the decentralized system produce the desired results.  
As we have seen above there are several factors that influence the outcome of the decentralization 
approach.  However, it is possible to find some crucial areas that seem to be the stumbling blocks in 
all sectors.  This paper identifies the following objectives to be most critical in implementation:     
Devising mechanisms to overcome financial inadequacy.  The reality is that the more economically 
well-off the area, the easier it is to mobilize resources both in terms of revenues and labor.  Under 
these circumstances financial inadequacy can be overcome by devolution of fiscal authority to raise 
revenue through user fees, wherever feasible or alternative mechanisms.  Further, this paves the way 
for local authority to budget which implies more flexibility in shifting funds to a service of more 
immediate concern locally.  For example the energy sector in Chile requires all users, private 
companies, and the state to contribute to the financing of expansion projects.  Other instruments 
such as matching grants and ear marked funds encourage financial responsibility provided they are 
used for the designated purpose in a transparent manner. 
Incorporating training and creating opportunities to upgrade skills must be an integral part of all 
planning strategy.  In addition, the need for data is equally significant.  In some contexts, as in the 
health sector in Chile or in targeted assistance projects, the formulae for grants and transfers are 
based on the number of registered beneficiaries.  The lack of accurate data results in underestimates 
of the levels of financing required for the programs.  In the context of river basins, the survival of   45
user associations and catchment councils depends on charges, such as levies on permits, collected 
from their members.  Details about membership, farming activities, and the extent of water usage are 
some of the many kinds of data that are essential for smooth functioning.  
Finding ways through reassignment in other areas, retrenching those who are ready to retire before 
others, and revision of pay scales among other means, to deal with resistance from entrenched staff 
and beneficiaries of the existing system  
Ensuring sustainability of the new decentralized structure through stakeholder commitment is 
another significant factor.   Uncertainty about whether the consultative process can sustain itself for 
the long term was illustrated in the case study on the water sector in Zimbabwe (Derman et al., 2000)  
Participants from communal areas have to travel long distances incurring costs for fares.  Time is 
spent at meetings discussing claims for reimbursement of costs at the expense of focus on water 
issues.  
While many aspects of the decentralization experience in other sectors are relevant for 
integrated river basin management, others are less easy to apply.  For instance, intersectoral 
coordination is vital to both river basin management and healthcare.  In the latter sector, matching 
the boundaries of health center jurisdictions to administrative boundaries of local governments is 
believed to be useful to facilitate intersectoral coordination.  However, a similar solution is not likely 
to be feasible in river basins, especially those that cross state and national borders, because 
geographic boundaries rarely match those in political administration.   
8. CONCLUSIONS 
Decentralization in its various forms—technological, regulatory, administrative, political, and fiscal—
is being experienced in sectors such as electric power supply, roads, targeted assistance programs, 
health, education, and irrigation management.  The challenge is to achieve and sustain the complex 
and complementary approaches to decentralization.    
The twin objectives of improving efficiency in governance and increasing equity at local levels remain 
the unifying themes.  To implement them the underlying principle common to all these sectors and 
to river basin management is that of subsidiarity, which argues that governance is more effective if 
the decision-making authority is located where the pertinent knowledge exists and where decision-
makers are directly responsible for the outcomes of actions taken to the community they serve.  
The shift of authority from central government to lower levels is still in its early stages and it is not 
surprising that many issues have to be tackled before the new system shows the desired results.  The 
decentralization process and experience in several sectors was reviewed in this report with a special 
focus on obstacles encountered in implementation.   
The main conclusions of the literature survey come as a caution to anyone who believes that 
decentralization is, in itself, a solution to problems of inefficiency and inequity in developing 
countries. The report shows that the case for decentralization as against central control is not itself 
unambiguous.  Central control offers distinct advantages in certain circumstances; there are trade-
offs and tensions to be reconciled (e.g., economies of scale versus local monitoring; integrated 
management or inter-regional equity versus local control).  
Nonetheless, decentralization (in its various forms and degrees) holds out the promise of reduced 
financial and transaction costs, increased flexibility and efficiency, local control and accountability.  
But the evidence from a wider range of surveys and case studies that the report reviews for several 
sectors (education, healthcare, roads, irrigation, and public infrastructure services) suggests that the 
preconditions for effective decentralization are daunting, especially given the historical, political and 
socio-economic conditions facing many developing countries.  
For example, successful decentralization depends on the regions or districts concerned having a large 
enough revenue base to undertake activities; it requires the existence of clearly defined property and 
water rights among potential stakeholders (for effective negotiation and commitment to operations 
and maintenance); it requires the socio-political pre-conditions for participation and the resistance of 
elite capture (e.g., unstratified social structures); and demands transparency, clear roles and 
responsibilities with legal authority, and quality information. For those anticipating that   46
decentralization might solve problems associated with weak centers and fiscal constraints, it is 
salutary to learn that decentralization works bests in the context of strong central government and 
economically prosperous regions with a high education and skills base.  
The case studies examined reveal the serious problems that occur when regulatory, administrative, 
political or fiscal mechanisms have not evolved sufficiently to support decentralization; or where 
skills accumulated in central bureaucracies are lost through retrenchment. More intractable still are 
factors of historical context and political leadership.  Many of the factors affecting degrees of elite 
capture in decentralization, such as land rights, power inequalities, and political resistance, are not 
easily amenable to policy interventions.  
The literature survey reveals that some debates, such as whether professional expertise is necessary to 
maintain minimum or desired standards in education, or of geographic boundaries in health system 
organization, are sector specific.  However, others, such as the need for political and financial 
accountability, the related data requirements, and educating stakeholders and potential beneficiaries 
of the new system and how they can participate in it, are true of decentralization wherever it is to 
unfold.   
In particular, this paper identifies four issues to be tackled that demand high priority.  These are (1) 
devising ways to overcome financial inadequacy at the lower level; (2) making a commitment to 
incorporating opportunities to upgrade skills, particularly management skills, when designing 
programs while also ensuring that the expertise accumulated in central bureaucracies is not 
dissipated; simultaneously encouraging those facing retrenchment to contribute to the new systems 
wherever feasible;  (3) assuring beneficiaries of the pre-reform structures, as with urban pharmacists 
in the African case studies (Hanson et al., 1997) or hydropower utilities in the Columbia-Snake River 
case study (Wandscneider, 1984), that their rights would be protected; and (4) planning to sustain a 
long-term commitment to the decentralization process as it is likely to be slow and drawn out, 
perhaps by demonstrating positive outcomes in a key element of the sector in question. 
The survey finds these lessons to be highly relevant for integrated river basin management through 
decentralization because they constitute the nitty-gritty details of the broader criteria for success 
identified in the context of river basins, namely, initial conditions, political leadership, subsidiarity, 
transparency, and property rights. 
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